Folk theorems in a class of additively separable games

We study a class of games featuring payoff functions where best reply functions are orthogonal and therefore the pure-strategy non-cooperative solution is attained as a Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies. We prove that the resulting threshold of the discount factor above which implicit collusio...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Mathematical social sciences 2018-03, Vol.92, p.10-15
Hauptverfasser:	Delbono, Flavio, Lambertini, Luca
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Cooperation Economic theory Game theory Games International relations Punishment Theory
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