Does economic performance affect officials’ turnover? Evidence from municipal government leaders in China
As is well known, Chinese central government has full authority to determine the provincial and local officials’ turnover. However, China has not in detail interpreted the standards of officials’ promotions so far. In this paper, the latest database of city-level leaders for the period between 2002...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Quality & quantity 2018-07, Vol.52 (4), p.1873-1891 |
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| creator | Shi, Yaobo Chang, Chun-Ping Jang, Chyi-Lu Hao, Yu |
| description | As is well known, Chinese central government has full authority to determine the provincial and local officials’ turnover. However, China has not in detail interpreted the standards of officials’ promotions so far. In this paper, the latest database of city-level leaders for the period between 2002 and 2013 is utilized to investigate the influences of economic performance on party secretaries’ odds of being promoted. The estimation results by a panel multinomial logit method indicate that municipal annual GDP per capita is significantly positively associated with leaders’ chances of promotion. Specifically, the average GDP growth rates during leaders’ tenures have much higher effects. Moreover, some important factors of leaders’ personal characteristics also affect the political turnover. For instance, party secretaries’ connection with China’s Communist Youth League, political experience, educational level and professional expertise all have positive impacts on their chances of obtaining a promotion. In contrast, leaders’ ages and tenures are found to be negatively related to their promotion possibilities. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11135-017-0573-9 |
| format | Article |
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| subjects | Academic achievement Central government Cities Communism Communist parties Correlation analysis Economic conditions Economic development Economic growth Economic performance Educational attainment Experts GDP Gross Domestic Product Local government Methodology of the Social Sciences Municipal government Personal characteristics Political leadership Political power Public officials Secretaries Social Sciences Youth |
| title | Does economic performance affect officials’ turnover? Evidence from municipal government leaders in China |
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