CEO duality and firm performance: evidence from Hong Kong
Purpose - This paper seeks to examine the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) duality and firm performance and the moderating effects of the family control factor on this relationship with respect to public companies in Hong Kong.Design methodology approach - This study employs public...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Corporate governance (Bradford) 2008-06, Vol.8 (3), p.299-316 |
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| creator | Yan Lam, Tin Kam Lee, Shu |
| description | Purpose - This paper seeks to examine the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) duality and firm performance and the moderating effects of the family control factor on this relationship with respect to public companies in Hong Kong.Design methodology approach - This study employs publicly available data from financial databases and the annual reports of a sample of 128 publicly-listed companies in Hong Kong in 2003.Findings - Neither agency theory nor stewardship theory alone can adequately explain the duality-performance relationship. The empirical evidence suggests that the relationship between CEO duality and accounting performance is contingent on the presence of the family control factor. CEO duality is good for non-family firms, while non-duality is good for family-controlled firms.Research limitations implications - The study is based on publicly available financial data, and actual board processes are not observed.Practical implications - The design of board leadership structure is contingent on corporate ownership and control (family control or not).Originality value - The paper provides empirical evidence that CEO duality is not necessarily bad for public companies in Hong Kong and would be of interest to regulatory bodies, business practitioners, and academic researchers. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1108/14720700810879187 |
| format | Article |
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CEO duality is good for non-family firms, while non-duality is good for family-controlled firms.Research limitations implications - The study is based on publicly available financial data, and actual board processes are not observed.Practical implications - The design of board leadership structure is contingent on corporate ownership and control (family control or not).Originality value - The paper provides empirical evidence that CEO duality is not necessarily bad for public companies in Hong Kong and would be of interest to regulatory bodies, business practitioners, and academic researchers.</description><subject>Board of Directors</subject><subject>Boards of directors</subject><subject>Chief executive officers</subject><subject>Chief executives</subject><subject>Corporate governance</subject><subject>Family</subject><subject>Hong Kong</subject><subject>Hypotheses</subject><subject>International business</subject><subject>Mathematical models</subject><subject>Monetary incentives</subject><subject>Organizational performance</subject><subject>Public companies</subject><subject>Statistical analysis</subject><subject>Studies</subject><issn>1472-0701</issn><issn>1758-6054</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2008</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><recordid>eNp1kFtLwzAUx4soOKcfwLfig09Wc9KkSX2TMTd1MMWJjyFtEunszaQV9-2NVBQmvpwL5_c_tyA4BnQOgPgFEIYRQ4j7hKXA2U4wAkZ5lCBKdn3s65EHYD84cG6NEMaYxaMgnUyXoeplWXSbUNYqNIWtwlZb09hK1rm-DPV7obSPQmObKpw39Ut4581hsGdk6fTRtx8HT9fT1WQeLZazm8nVIsoJpF0UMwogSUoR50YaJZmmVFFClOaQQZJpblSScaoUynOSximkOCOZMRgZQ-J4HJwOfVvbvPXadaIqXK7LUta66Z2IKU4YScGDJ1vguult7XcTGFFIYkgSD8EA5bZxzmojWltU0m4EIPH1SfHnk14TDZrCdfrjRyDtq0iYv0-QZyxWs_hhcv8I4tbzZwOvK21lqX5HbLcWrTIeR__g_270CRiFjnA</recordid><startdate>20080613</startdate><enddate>20080613</enddate><creator>Yan Lam, Tin</creator><creator>Kam Lee, Shu</creator><general>Emerald Group Publishing Limited</general><scope>BSCLL</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>0U~</scope><scope>1-H</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7X1</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>8AO</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ANIOZ</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>K8~</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>L.0</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>Q9U</scope><scope>7TA</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>JG9</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20080613</creationdate><title>CEO duality and firm performance: evidence from Hong Kong</title><author>Yan Lam, Tin ; Kam Lee, Shu</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c419t-37511a495088fafda7e55d544de81b16be8fd6b85dd0cc4939192b4bff20ff433</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2008</creationdate><topic>Board of Directors</topic><topic>Boards of directors</topic><topic>Chief executive officers</topic><topic>Chief executives</topic><topic>Corporate governance</topic><topic>Family</topic><topic>Hong Kong</topic><topic>Hypotheses</topic><topic>International business</topic><topic>Mathematical models</topic><topic>Monetary incentives</topic><topic>Organizational performance</topic><topic>Public companies</topic><topic>Statistical analysis</topic><topic>Studies</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Yan Lam, Tin</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kam Lee, Shu</creatorcontrib><collection>Istex</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Global News & ABI/Inform Professional</collection><collection>Trade PRO</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (PDF only)</collection><collection>Accounting & Tax Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ProQuest Pharma Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>Accounting, Tax & Banking Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection</collection><collection>DELNET Management Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Standard</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><collection>Materials Business File</collection><collection>Technology Research Database</collection><collection>Materials Research Database</collection><jtitle>Corporate governance (Bradford)</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Yan Lam, Tin</au><au>Kam Lee, Shu</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>CEO duality and firm performance: evidence from Hong Kong</atitle><jtitle>Corporate governance (Bradford)</jtitle><date>2008-06-13</date><risdate>2008</risdate><volume>8</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>299</spage><epage>316</epage><pages>299-316</pages><issn>1472-0701</issn><eissn>1758-6054</eissn><abstract>Purpose - This paper seeks to examine the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) duality and firm performance and the moderating effects of the family control factor on this relationship with respect to public companies in Hong Kong.Design methodology approach - This study employs publicly available data from financial databases and the annual reports of a sample of 128 publicly-listed companies in Hong Kong in 2003.Findings - Neither agency theory nor stewardship theory alone can adequately explain the duality-performance relationship. 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| identifier | ISSN: 1472-0701 |
| ispartof | Corporate governance (Bradford), 2008-06, Vol.8 (3), p.299-316 |
| issn | 1472-0701 1758-6054 |
| language | eng |
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| source | Emerald Journals; Standard: Emerald eJournal Premier Collection |
| subjects | Board of Directors Boards of directors Chief executive officers Chief executives Corporate governance Family Hong Kong Hypotheses International business Mathematical models Monetary incentives Organizational performance Public companies Statistical analysis Studies |
| title | CEO duality and firm performance: evidence from Hong Kong |
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