Exclusion in all‐pay auctions: An experimental investigation
Contest designers and managers who wish to maximize the overall revenue of a contest are frequently concerned with a trade‐off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of contestants with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable to exclude the strongest bidder i...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of economics & management strategy 2018-06, Vol.27 (2), p.326-339 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 339 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 2 |
| container_start_page | 326 |
| container_title | Journal of economics & management strategy |
| container_volume | 27 |
| creator | Fehr, Dietmar Schmid, Julia |
| description | Contest designers and managers who wish to maximize the overall revenue of a contest are frequently concerned with a trade‐off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of contestants with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable to exclude the strongest bidder in order to promote greater homogeneity among the remaining bidders, even though the theoretical exclusion principle predicts otherwise. This is because the strongest bidders are willing to give up a substantial portion of their expected rent in order to minimize the chance of losing the contest. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/jems.12243 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2047358326</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>2047358326</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c3673-bc38be5a25389cf0beac4d7e2e072c17f1c8be18b4a8a8a1d5f81c4a56d05fb13</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9kM1KxDAQx4MouK5efIKCN6FrJh9t6kFYlvrFigf1HNI0kZZuW5utbm8-gs_ok5haz84cZpj5zQd_hE4BL8DbRWk2bgGEMLqHZsApDhOgbN_nmIswYjg-REfOlRjjKKEwQ1fpTle9K5o6KOpAVdX351erhkD1euuL7jJY1oHZtaYrNqbeqspj78Zti1c19o_RgVWVMyd_cY5ertPn1W24fry5Wy3XoaZRTMNMU5EZrginItEWZ0ZplseGGBwTDbEF7fsgMqaEd8i5FaCZ4lGOuc2AztHZtLftmrfe35dl03e1PykJZjHlgpLIU-cTpbvGuc5Y2fq3VTdIwHLUR476yF99PAwT_FFUZviHlPfpw9M08wNSfWl7</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2047358326</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Exclusion in all‐pay auctions: An experimental investigation</title><source>Business Source Complete</source><source>Wiley Online Library All Journals</source><creator>Fehr, Dietmar ; Schmid, Julia</creator><creatorcontrib>Fehr, Dietmar ; Schmid, Julia</creatorcontrib><description>Contest designers and managers who wish to maximize the overall revenue of a contest are frequently concerned with a trade‐off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of contestants with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable to exclude the strongest bidder in order to promote greater homogeneity among the remaining bidders, even though the theoretical exclusion principle predicts otherwise. This is because the strongest bidders are willing to give up a substantial portion of their expected rent in order to minimize the chance of losing the contest.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1058-6407</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1530-9134</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1111/jems.12243</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Cambridge: Wiley Subscription Services, Inc</publisher><subject>Auctions ; Bids</subject><ispartof>Journal of economics & management strategy, 2018-06, Vol.27 (2), p.326-339</ispartof><rights>2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.</rights><rights>Copyright © 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c3673-bc38be5a25389cf0beac4d7e2e072c17f1c8be18b4a8a8a1d5f81c4a56d05fb13</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c3673-bc38be5a25389cf0beac4d7e2e072c17f1c8be18b4a8a8a1d5f81c4a56d05fb13</cites><orcidid>0000-0001-9735-390X</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111%2Fjems.12243$$EPDF$$P50$$Gwiley$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111%2Fjems.12243$$EHTML$$P50$$Gwiley$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,1417,27924,27925,45574,45575</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Fehr, Dietmar</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Schmid, Julia</creatorcontrib><title>Exclusion in all‐pay auctions: An experimental investigation</title><title>Journal of economics & management strategy</title><description>Contest designers and managers who wish to maximize the overall revenue of a contest are frequently concerned with a trade‐off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of contestants with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable to exclude the strongest bidder in order to promote greater homogeneity among the remaining bidders, even though the theoretical exclusion principle predicts otherwise. This is because the strongest bidders are willing to give up a substantial portion of their expected rent in order to minimize the chance of losing the contest.</description><subject>Auctions</subject><subject>Bids</subject><issn>1058-6407</issn><issn>1530-9134</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2018</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp9kM1KxDAQx4MouK5efIKCN6FrJh9t6kFYlvrFigf1HNI0kZZuW5utbm8-gs_ok5haz84cZpj5zQd_hE4BL8DbRWk2bgGEMLqHZsApDhOgbN_nmIswYjg-REfOlRjjKKEwQ1fpTle9K5o6KOpAVdX351erhkD1euuL7jJY1oHZtaYrNqbeqspj78Zti1c19o_RgVWVMyd_cY5ertPn1W24fry5Wy3XoaZRTMNMU5EZrginItEWZ0ZplseGGBwTDbEF7fsgMqaEd8i5FaCZ4lGOuc2AztHZtLftmrfe35dl03e1PykJZjHlgpLIU-cTpbvGuc5Y2fq3VTdIwHLUR476yF99PAwT_FFUZviHlPfpw9M08wNSfWl7</recordid><startdate>20180601</startdate><enddate>20180601</enddate><creator>Fehr, Dietmar</creator><creator>Schmid, Julia</creator><general>Wiley Subscription Services, Inc</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9735-390X</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20180601</creationdate><title>Exclusion in all‐pay auctions: An experimental investigation</title><author>Fehr, Dietmar ; Schmid, Julia</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c3673-bc38be5a25389cf0beac4d7e2e072c17f1c8be18b4a8a8a1d5f81c4a56d05fb13</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2018</creationdate><topic>Auctions</topic><topic>Bids</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Fehr, Dietmar</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Schmid, Julia</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Journal of economics & management strategy</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Fehr, Dietmar</au><au>Schmid, Julia</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Exclusion in all‐pay auctions: An experimental investigation</atitle><jtitle>Journal of economics & management strategy</jtitle><date>2018-06-01</date><risdate>2018</risdate><volume>27</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>326</spage><epage>339</epage><pages>326-339</pages><issn>1058-6407</issn><eissn>1530-9134</eissn><abstract>Contest designers and managers who wish to maximize the overall revenue of a contest are frequently concerned with a trade‐off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of contestants with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable to exclude the strongest bidder in order to promote greater homogeneity among the remaining bidders, even though the theoretical exclusion principle predicts otherwise. This is because the strongest bidders are willing to give up a substantial portion of their expected rent in order to minimize the chance of losing the contest.</abstract><cop>Cambridge</cop><pub>Wiley Subscription Services, Inc</pub><doi>10.1111/jems.12243</doi><tpages>14</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9735-390X</orcidid></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 1058-6407 |
| ispartof | Journal of economics & management strategy, 2018-06, Vol.27 (2), p.326-339 |
| issn | 1058-6407 1530-9134 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_2047358326 |
| source | Business Source Complete; Wiley Online Library All Journals |
| subjects | Auctions Bids |
| title | Exclusion in all‐pay auctions: An experimental investigation |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-21T17%3A14%3A46IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Exclusion%20in%20all%E2%80%90pay%20auctions:%20An%20experimental%20investigation&rft.jtitle=Journal%20of%20economics%20&%20management%20strategy&rft.au=Fehr,%20Dietmar&rft.date=2018-06-01&rft.volume=27&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=326&rft.epage=339&rft.pages=326-339&rft.issn=1058-6407&rft.eissn=1530-9134&rft_id=info:doi/10.1111/jems.12243&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E2047358326%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2047358326&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true |