Optimal advertising levies with application to the Norway-EU Salmon Agreement

This paper focuses on optimal advertising policy for a competitive industry that produces large tradeable surpluses and raises funds for promotion through per-unit levies on production or exports. Results indicate that an export levy biases the advertising budget allocation in favour of the export m...

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Veröffentlicht in:European review of agricultural economics 2000-03, Vol.27 (1), p.39-57
Hauptverfasser: Kinnucan, H.W, Myrland, O
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description This paper focuses on optimal advertising policy for a competitive industry that produces large tradeable surpluses and raises funds for promotion through per-unit levies on production or exports. Results indicate that an export levy biases the advertising budget allocation in favour of the export market, but provides no clear incentive to intensify advertising effort. Applying the model to the Norway-EU Salmon Agreement, results suggest that the current 3 per cent levy may be welfare-increasing from the Norwegian producer perspective. Whether the current budget allocation of 67 per cent to the EU is efficient depends critically on whether advertising elasticities across markets are uniform, a hypothesis that needs to be tested.
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identifier ISSN: 0165-1587
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source PAIS Index; Periodicals Index Online; Oxford University Press Journals All Titles (1996-Current)
subjects Advertising
Advertising expenditures
Agreements
Agricultural economics
domestic markets
econometric models
elasticities
Elasticity of demand
European Union
expenditure
export levy
Exports
generic advertising
levies
Marketing
non-price promotion
optimal levies
production
production levy
profitability
Salmo salar
salmon
trade agreements
welfare economics
title Optimal advertising levies with application to the Norway-EU Salmon Agreement
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