Useful New Equilibria for Differential Games with Side Interests of the Participants

For conflict static and dynamic problems (described by differential equations) considered either on a game set common for all participants or on partly intersecting game sets, we propose new notions of conflict equilibria which are efficient for seeking the solutions of coalition-free and cooperativ...

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Veröffentlicht in:Differential equations 2018-03, Vol.54 (3), p.401-412
1. Verfasser: Smol’yakov, E. R.
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description For conflict static and dynamic problems (described by differential equations) considered either on a game set common for all participants or on partly intersecting game sets, we propose new notions of conflict equilibria which are efficient for seeking the solutions of coalition-free and cooperative games and for specifying the hierarchy of all known equilibria. Several examples are used to show that, without the proposed new notions of equilibrium, an actually fair sharing may be impossible in cooperative games.
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source SpringerNature Journals
subjects Control Theory
Difference and Functional Equations
Differential equations
Differential games
Equilibrium
Game theory
Mathematical analysis
Mathematics
Mathematics and Statistics
Ordinary Differential Equations
Partial Differential Equations
title Useful New Equilibria for Differential Games with Side Interests of the Participants
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