The problem of polarization
This paper offers a unified political economy explanation of political extremism and moderation regarding income redistribution. Unlike the standard spatial voting model, the explanation herein recognizes that extremists are distinguished not only by their political positions, but also by the intens...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Public choice 2018-07, Vol.176 (1/2), p.315-340 |
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| creator | Grafstein, Robert |
| description | This paper offers a unified political economy explanation of political extremism and moderation regarding income redistribution. Unlike the standard spatial voting model, the explanation herein recognizes that extremists are distinguished not only by their political positions, but also by the intensity with which they hold them. The paper uses an extension of Aumann and Kurz’s (Econometrica 45(5):1137–1161, 1977) bargaining model to endogenize moderation and extremism in the context of democratic voting. The extension shows that low-income voters tend to be bolder in their redistributive demands and high-income voters tend to be more tenacious in defending them. These hypotheses are evaluated empirically using the Political Action Panel Study. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11127-018-0547-z |
| format | Article |
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| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; Springer Nature - Complete Springer Journals; Political Science Complete; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Bargaining Economic models Economics Economics and Finance Extremism Income Income redistribution Low income groups Moderation Polarization Political action Political economy Political Science Politics Public Finance Voters Voting |
| title | The problem of polarization |
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