Income tax schedule and redistribution in direct democracies – the Swiss case
This study examines redistribution policy through personal income taxes in Swiss cantons over the period 1995–2011. In a first step, redistribution measures are estimated with the help of exhaustive administrative data. Redistribution is decomposed into average tax rate and tax progression. In a sec...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of economic inequality 2018-09, Vol.16 (3), p.413-438 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 438 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 3 |
| container_start_page | 413 |
| container_title | Journal of economic inequality |
| container_volume | 16 |
| creator | Morger, Mario Schaltegger, Christoph A. |
| description | This study examines redistribution policy through personal income taxes in Swiss cantons over the period 1995–2011. In a first step, redistribution measures are estimated with the help of exhaustive administrative data. Redistribution is decomposed into average tax rate and tax progression. In a second step, we investigate the impact of direct democratic institutions and their usage on tax policy and redistribution. The results suggest that the effect of direct democracy on income tax redistribution is a multilayered process. First, the theoretical availability of direct democracy tools does not seem to have the same impact as the effective use of them. Second, fiscal referendums may – in the short term –reduce redistribution through lower tax rates and lead to less tax progression. Third, an increasing number of ballots on initiatives leads to more tax progression and more redistribution in the long run. It seems that the short-term dampening effects of fiscal referendums on redistribution may be overridden in the long run by the expansive effect of popular initiatives. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s10888-018-9376-z |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>gale_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2025513412</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><galeid>A727513410</galeid><sourcerecordid>A727513410</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c420t-277a92e5b2663390c829f0c076d5981251b5df13a14ce81e198eb7c23cce6baa3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp1kEtOwzAQhi0EEqVwAHaWWLt4nCZ2llXFo1KlLoC15TiT1lXrFDsVjxV34IacBJcgsUKzmNHo_-bxE3IJfAScy-sIXCnFOChWZrJg70dkALnMmJIcjg91UTKQAk7JWYxrzkWuOAzIYuZtu0XamVca7Qrr_Qap8TUNWLvYBVftO9d66jytXUDb0Rq3rQ3GOoz06-OTdiukDy8uRmpNxHNy0phNxIvfPCRPtzeP03s2X9zNppM5s2PBOyakNKXAvBJFkWUlt0qUDbdcFnVeKhA5VHndQGZgbFEBQqmwklZk1mJRGZMNyVU_dxfa5z3GTq_bffBppRbptxyyMYikGvWqpdmgdr5pu3R5ivSEs63HxqX-RAr5A_AEQA_Y0MYYsNG74LYmvGng-mC07o3WyWh9MFq_J0b0TExav8Twd8r_0Df0eoEZ</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2025513412</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Income tax schedule and redistribution in direct democracies – the Swiss case</title><source>Business Source Complete</source><source>SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings</source><creator>Morger, Mario ; Schaltegger, Christoph A.</creator><creatorcontrib>Morger, Mario ; Schaltegger, Christoph A.</creatorcontrib><description>This study examines redistribution policy through personal income taxes in Swiss cantons over the period 1995–2011. In a first step, redistribution measures are estimated with the help of exhaustive administrative data. Redistribution is decomposed into average tax rate and tax progression. In a second step, we investigate the impact of direct democratic institutions and their usage on tax policy and redistribution. The results suggest that the effect of direct democracy on income tax redistribution is a multilayered process. First, the theoretical availability of direct democracy tools does not seem to have the same impact as the effective use of them. Second, fiscal referendums may – in the short term –reduce redistribution through lower tax rates and lead to less tax progression. Third, an increasing number of ballots on initiatives leads to more tax progression and more redistribution in the long run. It seems that the short-term dampening effects of fiscal referendums on redistribution may be overridden in the long run by the expansive effect of popular initiatives.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1569-1721</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1573-8701</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1007/s10888-018-9376-z</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>New York: Springer US</publisher><subject>Democracy ; Development Economics ; Direct democracy ; Economic Growth ; Economic models ; Economics ; Economics and Finance ; Income redistribution ; Income tax ; Income taxes ; International Economics ; Personal finance ; Political aspects ; Political Science ; Public Finance ; Referendums ; Studies ; Tax law ; Tax rates</subject><ispartof>Journal of economic inequality, 2018-09, Vol.16 (3), p.413-438</ispartof><rights>Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018</rights><rights>COPYRIGHT 2018 Springer</rights><rights>The Journal of Economic Inequality is a copyright of Springer, (2018). All Rights Reserved.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c420t-277a92e5b2663390c829f0c076d5981251b5df13a14ce81e198eb7c23cce6baa3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c420t-277a92e5b2663390c829f0c076d5981251b5df13a14ce81e198eb7c23cce6baa3</cites><orcidid>0000-0001-9826-444X</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10888-018-9376-z$$EPDF$$P50$$Gspringer$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10888-018-9376-z$$EHTML$$P50$$Gspringer$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,27923,27924,41487,42556,51318</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Morger, Mario</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Schaltegger, Christoph A.</creatorcontrib><title>Income tax schedule and redistribution in direct democracies – the Swiss case</title><title>Journal of economic inequality</title><addtitle>J Econ Inequal</addtitle><description>This study examines redistribution policy through personal income taxes in Swiss cantons over the period 1995–2011. In a first step, redistribution measures are estimated with the help of exhaustive administrative data. Redistribution is decomposed into average tax rate and tax progression. In a second step, we investigate the impact of direct democratic institutions and their usage on tax policy and redistribution. The results suggest that the effect of direct democracy on income tax redistribution is a multilayered process. First, the theoretical availability of direct democracy tools does not seem to have the same impact as the effective use of them. Second, fiscal referendums may – in the short term –reduce redistribution through lower tax rates and lead to less tax progression. Third, an increasing number of ballots on initiatives leads to more tax progression and more redistribution in the long run. It seems that the short-term dampening effects of fiscal referendums on redistribution may be overridden in the long run by the expansive effect of popular initiatives.</description><subject>Democracy</subject><subject>Development Economics</subject><subject>Direct democracy</subject><subject>Economic Growth</subject><subject>Economic models</subject><subject>Economics</subject><subject>Economics and Finance</subject><subject>Income redistribution</subject><subject>Income tax</subject><subject>Income taxes</subject><subject>International Economics</subject><subject>Personal finance</subject><subject>Political aspects</subject><subject>Political Science</subject><subject>Public Finance</subject><subject>Referendums</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Tax law</subject><subject>Tax rates</subject><issn>1569-1721</issn><issn>1573-8701</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2018</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><recordid>eNp1kEtOwzAQhi0EEqVwAHaWWLt4nCZ2llXFo1KlLoC15TiT1lXrFDsVjxV34IacBJcgsUKzmNHo_-bxE3IJfAScy-sIXCnFOChWZrJg70dkALnMmJIcjg91UTKQAk7JWYxrzkWuOAzIYuZtu0XamVca7Qrr_Qap8TUNWLvYBVftO9d66jytXUDb0Rq3rQ3GOoz06-OTdiukDy8uRmpNxHNy0phNxIvfPCRPtzeP03s2X9zNppM5s2PBOyakNKXAvBJFkWUlt0qUDbdcFnVeKhA5VHndQGZgbFEBQqmwklZk1mJRGZMNyVU_dxfa5z3GTq_bffBppRbptxyyMYikGvWqpdmgdr5pu3R5ivSEs63HxqX-RAr5A_AEQA_Y0MYYsNG74LYmvGng-mC07o3WyWh9MFq_J0b0TExav8Twd8r_0Df0eoEZ</recordid><startdate>20180901</startdate><enddate>20180901</enddate><creator>Morger, Mario</creator><creator>Schaltegger, Christoph A.</creator><general>Springer US</general><general>Springer</general><general>Springer Nature B.V</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>8AO</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>Q9U</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9826-444X</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20180901</creationdate><title>Income tax schedule and redistribution in direct democracies – the Swiss case</title><author>Morger, Mario ; Schaltegger, Christoph A.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c420t-277a92e5b2663390c829f0c076d5981251b5df13a14ce81e198eb7c23cce6baa3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2018</creationdate><topic>Democracy</topic><topic>Development Economics</topic><topic>Direct democracy</topic><topic>Economic Growth</topic><topic>Economic models</topic><topic>Economics</topic><topic>Economics and Finance</topic><topic>Income redistribution</topic><topic>Income tax</topic><topic>Income taxes</topic><topic>International Economics</topic><topic>Personal finance</topic><topic>Political aspects</topic><topic>Political Science</topic><topic>Public Finance</topic><topic>Referendums</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Tax law</topic><topic>Tax rates</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Morger, Mario</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Schaltegger, Christoph A.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (PDF only)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Pharma Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><jtitle>Journal of economic inequality</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Morger, Mario</au><au>Schaltegger, Christoph A.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Income tax schedule and redistribution in direct democracies – the Swiss case</atitle><jtitle>Journal of economic inequality</jtitle><stitle>J Econ Inequal</stitle><date>2018-09-01</date><risdate>2018</risdate><volume>16</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>413</spage><epage>438</epage><pages>413-438</pages><issn>1569-1721</issn><eissn>1573-8701</eissn><abstract>This study examines redistribution policy through personal income taxes in Swiss cantons over the period 1995–2011. In a first step, redistribution measures are estimated with the help of exhaustive administrative data. Redistribution is decomposed into average tax rate and tax progression. In a second step, we investigate the impact of direct democratic institutions and their usage on tax policy and redistribution. The results suggest that the effect of direct democracy on income tax redistribution is a multilayered process. First, the theoretical availability of direct democracy tools does not seem to have the same impact as the effective use of them. Second, fiscal referendums may – in the short term –reduce redistribution through lower tax rates and lead to less tax progression. Third, an increasing number of ballots on initiatives leads to more tax progression and more redistribution in the long run. It seems that the short-term dampening effects of fiscal referendums on redistribution may be overridden in the long run by the expansive effect of popular initiatives.</abstract><cop>New York</cop><pub>Springer US</pub><doi>10.1007/s10888-018-9376-z</doi><tpages>26</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9826-444X</orcidid></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 1569-1721 |
| ispartof | Journal of economic inequality, 2018-09, Vol.16 (3), p.413-438 |
| issn | 1569-1721 1573-8701 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_2025513412 |
| source | Business Source Complete; SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings |
| subjects | Democracy Development Economics Direct democracy Economic Growth Economic models Economics Economics and Finance Income redistribution Income tax Income taxes International Economics Personal finance Political aspects Political Science Public Finance Referendums Studies Tax law Tax rates |
| title | Income tax schedule and redistribution in direct democracies – the Swiss case |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-12T14%3A37%3A14IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-gale_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Income%20tax%20schedule%20and%20redistribution%20in%20direct%20democracies%20%E2%80%93%20the%20Swiss%20case&rft.jtitle=Journal%20of%20economic%20inequality&rft.au=Morger,%20Mario&rft.date=2018-09-01&rft.volume=16&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=413&rft.epage=438&rft.pages=413-438&rft.issn=1569-1721&rft.eissn=1573-8701&rft_id=info:doi/10.1007/s10888-018-9376-z&rft_dat=%3Cgale_proqu%3EA727513410%3C/gale_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2025513412&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_galeid=A727513410&rfr_iscdi=true |