Sectoral Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which Relationship is Best?
We consider the interplay between regulatory agencies with overlapping competencies: for example, a competition authority and a sectoral regulator. This reflects the current situation in the European Union and in the US. We analyse how authorities’incentives to act are affected if they can decide in...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Review of industrial organization 2018-05, Vol.52 (3), p.451-472 |
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| container_end_page | 472 |
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| container_issue | 3 |
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| container_title | Review of industrial organization |
| container_volume | 52 |
| creator | Barros, Pedro P. Hoernig, Steffen H. |
| description | We consider the interplay between regulatory agencies with overlapping competencies: for example, a competition authority and a sectoral regulator. This reflects the current situation in the European Union and in the US. We analyse how authorities’incentives to act are affected if they can decide independently, or must follow each others’ opinions, respectively, and consider how this relationship performs in the presence of institutional biases and lobbying efforts. A higher likelihood of closing a case tends to be achieved when the authorities act independently of each other: the probability of coming to a decision is higher, and decisions are less vulnerable to lobbying. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11151-017-9582-z |
| format | Article |
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A higher likelihood of closing a case tends to be achieved when the authorities act independently of each other: the probability of coming to a decision is higher, and decisions are less vulnerable to lobbying.</description><subject>Authority</subject><subject>Bias</subject><subject>Competition</subject><subject>Economics</subject><subject>Economics and Finance</subject><subject>Incentives</subject><subject>Industrial Organization</subject><subject>Lobbying</subject><subject>Microeconomics</subject><subject>Price fixing</subject><subject>Regulatory agencies</subject><issn>0889-938X</issn><issn>1573-7160</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2018</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kE1LAzEQhoMoWKs_wIOw4DmaSTad7LEUrUJB8AO8hexutt3SbmqSPbS_3pQVvXmaObzPO8NDyDWwO2AM7wMASKAMkBZScXo4ISOQKCjChJ2SEVOqoIVQn-fkIoQ1Y4mS-YjAm62i82aTvdplvzFpD5np6iyubDZz252NbWxdl037uHK-jftLctaYTbBXP3NMPh4f3mdPdPEyf55NF7TKmYhUWajQWlFXRvBKWMkN5zjBGpGXjcFalGABCuRYmkI0gKUVEooyl0bUmIsxuR16d9599TZEvXa979JJzRkXhZJK8JSCIVV5F4K3jd75dmv8XgPTRzN6MKOTGX00ow-J4QMTUrZbWv_X_B90M0DrkBz9XskV8vQME9-9rG-0</recordid><startdate>20180501</startdate><enddate>20180501</enddate><creator>Barros, Pedro P.</creator><creator>Hoernig, Steffen H.</creator><general>Springer Science + Business Media</general><general>Springer US</general><general>Springer Nature B.V</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>0-V</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>8AO</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ALSLI</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope><scope>DPSOV</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>KC-</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>M2L</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>Q9U</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20180501</creationdate><title>Sectoral Regulators and the Competition Authority</title><author>Barros, Pedro P. ; 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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0889-938X |
| ispartof | Review of industrial organization, 2018-05, Vol.52 (3), p.451-472 |
| issn | 0889-938X 1573-7160 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_2023985832 |
| source | PAIS Index; Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings |
| subjects | Authority Bias Competition Economics Economics and Finance Incentives Industrial Organization Lobbying Microeconomics Price fixing Regulatory agencies |
| title | Sectoral Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which Relationship is Best? |
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