Weak rationalizability and Arrovian impossibility theorems for responsive social choice

This paper provides representation theorems for choice functions satisfying weak rationality conditions: a choice function satisfies α if and only if it can be expressed as the union of intersections of maximal sets of a fixed collection of acyclic relations, and a choice function satisfies γ if and...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Public choice 2019-04, Vol.179 (1/2), p.7-40
1. Verfasser:	Duggan, John
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Economic models Economics Economics and Finance Function Independence Pareto optimum Political Science Power Preferences Pricing policies Public Finance Rationality Representation Responsiveness Social choice
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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