Probabilistic Voting and Accountability in Elections with Uncertain Policy Constraints

We consider accountability in repeated elections with two long‐lived parties that have distinct policy preferences and different levels of valence. In each period the government faces a privately observed feasibility constraint and selects a publicly observed policy vector. While pure strategy equil...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of public economic theory 2007-02, Vol.9 (1), p.41-68
1. Verfasser:	MEIROWITZ, ADAM
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Accountability Economic theory Elections Equilibrium Policy making Studies Voter behavior
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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