Probabilistic Voting and Accountability in Elections with Uncertain Policy Constraints
We consider accountability in repeated elections with two long‐lived parties that have distinct policy preferences and different levels of valence. In each period the government faces a privately observed feasibility constraint and selects a publicly observed policy vector. While pure strategy equil...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of public economic theory 2007-02, Vol.9 (1), p.41-68 |
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description | We consider accountability in repeated elections with two long‐lived parties that have distinct policy preferences and different levels of valence. In each period the government faces a privately observed feasibility constraint and selects a publicly observed policy vector. While pure strategy equilibria do not exhibit tight control on government policy making, complete control is possible in mixed strategies. In optimal equilibria voters use reelection functions which depend on policy in a manner that causes the governing party to internalize voter preferences. In these optimal equilibria the voters use different reelection functions for different parties. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00297.x |
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In these optimal equilibria the voters use different reelection functions for different parties.</description><subject>Accountability</subject><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Elections</subject><subject>Equilibrium</subject><subject>Policy making</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Voter behavior</subject><issn>1097-3923</issn><issn>1467-9779</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2007</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>X2L</sourceid><recordid>eNqNkU-P0zAQxSMEEsvCd4i4J_hPbMcHDktVCqhaetjtSlxGjuOwDtkkOC7bfHumDeoZS08e-fk3Hj0nSUpJTnF9aHNaSJVppXTOCFE5IUyr_PgiuboYL7EmWmVcM_46eTNNLSGEl0JfJftdGCpT-c5P0dt0P0Tf_0xNX6c31g6HPp69OKe-T9eds9EP_ZQ--_iY3vfWhWjQ2A2dt3O6QisGPIjT2-RVY7rJvfu3Xyf3n9d3qy_Z9vvm6-pmm1lBChyIKFfXDS-stJo5QYQspaDMNoqVRJK6IFWtmrIpC2oIE5opWVJVq0o0xljDr5P3S98xDL8PborQDofQ45PACBWSyELjpXK5ZMMwTcE1MAb_ZMIMlMApRGjhlBWcsoJTiHAOEY6IbhY0uNHZC1d1ph0rTAP-ADcaNaPOJDceRVEjqqAgS3iMT9jp49Lp2Xdu_u8J4NtufYcV8tnC40e544U34RdIxZWAh9sN_Pj0wDdiv4Vb_hfNG6Bd</recordid><startdate>200702</startdate><enddate>200702</enddate><creator>MEIROWITZ, ADAM</creator><general>Blackwell Publishing Inc</general><general>Association for Public Economic Theory</general><general>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</general><scope>BSCLL</scope><scope>DKI</scope><scope>X2L</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope></search><sort><creationdate>200702</creationdate><title>Probabilistic Voting and Accountability in Elections with Uncertain Policy Constraints</title><author>MEIROWITZ, ADAM</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c5047-307eddf34c6c92e505686512cf728060d40bd7f8f841a0259276817d7b5faaca3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2007</creationdate><topic>Accountability</topic><topic>Economic theory</topic><topic>Elections</topic><topic>Equilibrium</topic><topic>Policy making</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Voter behavior</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>MEIROWITZ, ADAM</creatorcontrib><collection>Istex</collection><collection>RePEc IDEAS</collection><collection>RePEc</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><jtitle>Journal of public economic theory</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>MEIROWITZ, ADAM</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Probabilistic Voting and Accountability in Elections with Uncertain Policy Constraints</atitle><jtitle>Journal of public economic theory</jtitle><date>2007-02</date><risdate>2007</risdate><volume>9</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>41</spage><epage>68</epage><pages>41-68</pages><issn>1097-3923</issn><eissn>1467-9779</eissn><abstract>We consider accountability in repeated elections with two long‐lived parties that have distinct policy preferences and different levels of valence. In each period the government faces a privately observed feasibility constraint and selects a publicly observed policy vector. While pure strategy equilibria do not exhibit tight control on government policy making, complete control is possible in mixed strategies. In optimal equilibria voters use reelection functions which depend on policy in a manner that causes the governing party to internalize voter preferences. In these optimal equilibria the voters use different reelection functions for different parties.</abstract><cop>Malden, USA</cop><pub>Blackwell Publishing Inc</pub><doi>10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00297.x</doi><tpages>28</tpages></addata></record> |
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subjects | Accountability Economic theory Elections Equilibrium Policy making Studies Voter behavior |
title | Probabilistic Voting and Accountability in Elections with Uncertain Policy Constraints |
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