dynamics of deterrence
Because punishment is scarce, costly, and painful, optimal enforcement strategies will minimize the amount of actual punishment required to effectuate deterrence. If potential offenders are sufficiently deterrable, increasing the conditional probability of punishment (given violation) can reduce the...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences - PNAS 2009-08, Vol.106 (34), p.14230-14235 |
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| container_issue | 34 |
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| container_title | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences - PNAS |
| container_volume | 106 |
| creator | Kleiman, Mark Kilmer, Beau |
| description | Because punishment is scarce, costly, and painful, optimal enforcement strategies will minimize the amount of actual punishment required to effectuate deterrence. If potential offenders are sufficiently deterrable, increasing the conditional probability of punishment (given violation) can reduce the amount of punishment actually inflicted, by "tipping" a situation from its high-violation equilibrium to its low-violation equilibrium. Compared to random or "equal opportunity" enforcement, dynamically concentrated sanctions can reduce the punishment level necessary to tip the system, especially if preceded by warnings. Game theory and some simple and robust Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate these results, which, in addition to their potential for reducing crime and incarceration, may have implications for both management and regulation. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1073/pnas.0905513106 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences - PNAS, 2009-08, Vol.106 (34), p.14230-14235 |
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| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; MEDLINE; PubMed Central; Alma/SFX Local Collection; Free Full-Text Journals in Chemistry |
| subjects | Animals Behavior deterrence Compliance costs Computer Simulation Conditional probabilities Cooperative Behavior Crime - prevention & control Criminal punishment Criminals Economic sanctions Game Theory Humans Law enforcement Models, Psychological Monte Carlo Method Monte Carlo simulation Nash equilibrium Prisons Punishment Social Behavior Social Sciences Violations Warnings |
| title | dynamics of deterrence |
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