STOCHASTIC EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS IN THE REPEATED PRISONERS' DILEMMA

This paper explores boundedly rational behavior in the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. Strategy choices are modeled as finite automata, and the evolution of populations through asexual reproduction with mutation is explored. Evolutionary success is based on how well the strategy does in...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Economic inquiry 1994-04, Vol.32 (2), p.342-357
1. Verfasser:	Linster, Bruce G.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Economic models Economics Game theory Prisoner's dilemma game Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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