INDUSTRY INCOME and CONGRESSIONAL REGULATORY LEGISLATION: INTEREST GROUPS VS. MEDIAN VOTER
Interest group theories of regulation suggest that industries will be able to gain political benefits at the expense of the larger, but disorganized and disinterested, general public. However, casual observation indicates that industries are often the targets of costly legislation. We examine how th...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Economic inquiry 1992-01, Vol.30 (1), p.47-56 |
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| creator | Cahan, Steven F. Kaempfer, William H. |
| description | Interest group theories of regulation suggest that industries will be able to gain political benefits at the expense of the larger, but disorganized and disinterested, general public. However, casual observation indicates that industries are often the targets of costly legislation. We examine how the political influence and vulnerability of industries are affected by industry income. Results show wealthy industries are more likely to be subject to costly legislation, whereas no relationship was found between industry income and the granting of political benefits. We interpret these results as supportive of both interest group and median voter models of the political process. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1992.tb01534.x |
| format | Article |
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| identifier | ISSN: 0095-2583 |
| ispartof | Economic inquiry, 1992-01, Vol.30 (1), p.47-56 |
| issn | 0095-2583 1465-7295 |
| language | eng |
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| source | Periodicals Index Online; Alma/SFX Local Collection |
| subjects | Comparative studies Economic impact Economic models Economic theory Federal legislation Government regulation of business Identification and classification Income distribution Industry Interest groups Laws, regulations and rules Legislation Political activity Politics Pressure groups Regression analysis Regulation Voters |
| title | INDUSTRY INCOME and CONGRESSIONAL REGULATORY LEGISLATION: INTEREST GROUPS VS. MEDIAN VOTER |
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