The elementary economics of social dilemmas
. A social dilemma is, in essence, a prisoners’ dilemma in a continuous strategy space. I discuss a number of social dilemmas that have caught my attention, offer an elementary, diagrammatic synthesis of them, and discuss some of the economic insights that the diagrams capture, including incentives...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The Canadian journal of economics 2004-11, Vol.37 (4), p.805-829 |
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container_title | The Canadian journal of economics |
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description | . A social dilemma is, in essence, a prisoners’ dilemma in a continuous strategy space. I discuss a number of social dilemmas that have caught my attention, offer an elementary, diagrammatic synthesis of them, and discuss some of the economic insights that the diagrams capture, including incentives for pre‐commitment. Finally, I model pre‐commitment via delegation and link results to the literature on the evolution of preferences.
L’économie élémentaire des dilemmes sociaux. Un dilemme social est essentiellement un dilemme du prisonnier dans un espace continu de stratégie. L’auteur discute d’un certain nombre de dilemmes sociaux qui ont retenu son attention, il en propose une synthése graphique élémentaire, et discute certaines des suggestions économiques qui découlent de ces diagrammes, comme par exemple les incitations à se pré‐engager. Finalement, l’auteur construit un modèle de pré‐engagement par délégation et relie ses résultats à la littérature sur l’évolution des références. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1111/j.0008-4085.2004.00249.x |
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L’économie élémentaire des dilemmes sociaux. Un dilemme social est essentiellement un dilemme du prisonnier dans un espace continu de stratégie. L’auteur discute d’un certain nombre de dilemmes sociaux qui ont retenu son attention, il en propose une synthése graphique élémentaire, et discute certaines des suggestions économiques qui découlent de ces diagrammes, comme par exemple les incitations à se pré‐engager. Finalement, l’auteur construit un modèle de pré‐engagement par délégation et relie ses résultats à la littérature sur l’évolution des références.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0008-4085</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1540-5982</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1111/j.0008-4085.2004.00249.x</identifier><identifier>CODEN: CJECBC</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Oxford, UK; Malden, USA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd/Inc</publisher><subject>Economic models ; Economic theory ; Game theory ; Studies</subject><ispartof>The Canadian journal of economics, 2004-11, Vol.37 (4), p.805-829</ispartof><rights>Copyright Blackwell Publishing Nov 2004</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c5069-3accfaaa44afb8242756e67745fb38501e5e4fffbdb6a9fa02a21b5f7a88fb9b3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c5069-3accfaaa44afb8242756e67745fb38501e5e4fffbdb6a9fa02a21b5f7a88fb9b3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111%2Fj.0008-4085.2004.00249.x$$EPDF$$P50$$Gwiley$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111%2Fj.0008-4085.2004.00249.x$$EHTML$$P50$$Gwiley$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,1411,27903,27904,45553,45554</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Curtis Eaton, B.</creatorcontrib><title>The elementary economics of social dilemmas</title><title>The Canadian journal of economics</title><description>. A social dilemma is, in essence, a prisoners’ dilemma in a continuous strategy space. I discuss a number of social dilemmas that have caught my attention, offer an elementary, diagrammatic synthesis of them, and discuss some of the economic insights that the diagrams capture, including incentives for pre‐commitment. Finally, I model pre‐commitment via delegation and link results to the literature on the evolution of preferences.
L’économie élémentaire des dilemmes sociaux. Un dilemme social est essentiellement un dilemme du prisonnier dans un espace continu de stratégie. L’auteur discute d’un certain nombre de dilemmes sociaux qui ont retenu son attention, il en propose une synthése graphique élémentaire, et discute certaines des suggestions économiques qui découlent de ces diagrammes, comme par exemple les incitations à se pré‐engager. Finalement, l’auteur construit un modèle de pré‐engagement par délégation et relie ses résultats à la littérature sur l’évolution des références.</description><subject>Economic models</subject><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Studies</subject><issn>0008-4085</issn><issn>1540-5982</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2004</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNqNkMFOwzAQRC0EEqXwDxFXlLB27MQ-cKhKKaCqHCgCcVk5qS0SmqbEqWj_HoegnpmLbXnermYICShE1Ou6jABAhhykiBgA90_GVbQ7IgMqOIRCSXZMBgfTKTlzroROFAbkavFhArMylVm3utkHJq_XdVXkLqht4Oq80KtgWfj_SrtzcmL1ypmLv3NIXu4mi_F9OHuaPoxHszAXkKgw1nlutdaca5tJxlkqEpOkKRc2i6UAaoTh1tpsmSVaWQ1MM5oJm2opbaayeEgu-7mbpv7aGtdiWW-btV-JVCnFQaTUm2RvypvaucZY3DRF5SMgBeyawRK70NiFxq4Z_G0Gdx696dFvH2z_bw7Ho8eJv3k-7PnCtWZ34HXziUkapwJf51Nkb-9qPo1v8Tn-AUMOeFQ</recordid><startdate>200411</startdate><enddate>200411</enddate><creator>Curtis Eaton, B.</creator><general>Blackwell Publishing Ltd/Inc</general><general>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</general><scope>BSCLL</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>200411</creationdate><title>The elementary economics of social dilemmas</title><author>Curtis Eaton, B.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c5069-3accfaaa44afb8242756e67745fb38501e5e4fffbdb6a9fa02a21b5f7a88fb9b3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2004</creationdate><topic>Economic models</topic><topic>Economic theory</topic><topic>Game theory</topic><topic>Studies</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Curtis Eaton, B.</creatorcontrib><collection>Istex</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>The Canadian journal of economics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Curtis Eaton, B.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>The elementary economics of social dilemmas</atitle><jtitle>The Canadian journal of economics</jtitle><date>2004-11</date><risdate>2004</risdate><volume>37</volume><issue>4</issue><spage>805</spage><epage>829</epage><pages>805-829</pages><issn>0008-4085</issn><eissn>1540-5982</eissn><coden>CJECBC</coden><abstract>. A social dilemma is, in essence, a prisoners’ dilemma in a continuous strategy space. I discuss a number of social dilemmas that have caught my attention, offer an elementary, diagrammatic synthesis of them, and discuss some of the economic insights that the diagrams capture, including incentives for pre‐commitment. Finally, I model pre‐commitment via delegation and link results to the literature on the evolution of preferences.
L’économie élémentaire des dilemmes sociaux. Un dilemme social est essentiellement un dilemme du prisonnier dans un espace continu de stratégie. L’auteur discute d’un certain nombre de dilemmes sociaux qui ont retenu son attention, il en propose une synthése graphique élémentaire, et discute certaines des suggestions économiques qui découlent de ces diagrammes, comme par exemple les incitations à se pré‐engager. Finalement, l’auteur construit un modèle de pré‐engagement par délégation et relie ses résultats à la littérature sur l’évolution des références.</abstract><cop>Oxford, UK; Malden, USA</cop><pub>Blackwell Publishing Ltd/Inc</pub><doi>10.1111/j.0008-4085.2004.00249.x</doi><tpages>25</tpages></addata></record> |
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subjects | Economic models Economic theory Game theory Studies |
title | The elementary economics of social dilemmas |
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