The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods under Varying Income Distributions

The Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) model of voluntary contributions to public goods predicts increases in public good provision as the distribution of income becomes more unequal. This model is tested in the laboratory. Group behaviour conforms to the model but individual behaviour does not. In...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Canadian journal of economics 1996-02, Vol.29 (1), p.54-69
Hauptverfasser: Chan, Kenneth S., Mestelman, Stuart, Moir, Rob, Muller, R. Andrew
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container_title The Canadian journal of economics
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creator Chan, Kenneth S.
Mestelman, Stuart
Moir, Rob
Muller, R. Andrew
description The Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) model of voluntary contributions to public goods predicts increases in public good provision as the distribution of income becomes more unequal. This model is tested in the laboratory. Group behaviour conforms to the model but individual behaviour does not. Individuals with low incomes overcontribute to the public good; individuals with high incomes undercontribute. /// L'offre volontaire de biens publics dans diverses situations de répartition des revenus. Le modèle de contributions volontaires à la fourniture de biens publics suggéré par Bergstrom, Blume et Varian (1986) prédit qu'il y aura des accroissements dans la fourniture de biens publics à proportion que la répartition des revenus devient plus inégale. Les auteurs ont testé ce modèle en laboratoire. Le comportement du groupe se conforme au modèle mais pas le comportement de l'individu. Les individus qui ont de faibles revenus sur-contribuent au bien public; les individus dont les revenus sont élevés sous-contribuent.
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source Business Source Complete; Periodicals Index Online; Jstor Complete Legacy
subjects Aggregate income
Budget allocation
Correlation analysis
Donations
Economic models
Economic theory
Environmental laboratories
Income
Income distribution
Income redistribution
Income shares
Modeling
Nash equilibrium
Public good
Public goods
Studies
T tests
title The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods under Varying Income Distributions
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