Board Control, Remuneration Committees, and Top Management Compensation
Using panel data on large, publicly traded UK companies gathered between 1991 and 1994, a study examines the role of board control and remuneration committees in determining management compensation. Board monitoring, measured in terms of the proportion of nonexecutive directors on a board and the pr...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Academy of Management journal 1998-04, Vol.41 (2), p.146-157 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | Using panel data on large, publicly traded UK companies gathered between 1991 and 1994, a study examines the role of board control and remuneration committees in determining management compensation. Board monitoring, measured in terms of the proportion of nonexecutive directors on a board and the presence of remuneration committees and CEO duality, had only a limited effect on the level of top management pay. An important conclusion was that top management pay and corporate performance are more aligned in companies with outsider-dominated boards and remuneration committees. |
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ISSN: | 0001-4273 0000-1427 1948-0989 |
DOI: | 10.5465/257099 |