A dilemma for the soul theory of personal identity
The problem of diachronic personal identity is this: what explains why a person P₁ at time T₁ is numerically identical with a person P₂ at a later time T₂, even if they are not at those times qualitatively identical? One traditional explanation is the soul theory, according to which persons persist...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | International journal for philosophy of religion 2018-02, Vol.83 (1), p.41-55 |
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| container_title | International journal for philosophy of religion |
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| creator | Berger, Jacob |
| description | The problem of diachronic personal identity is this: what explains why a person P₁ at time T₁ is numerically identical with a person P₂ at a later time T₂, even if they are not at those times qualitatively identical? One traditional explanation is the soul theory, according to which persons persist in virtue of their nonphysical souls. I argue here that this view faces a new and arguably insuperable dilemma: either (a) souls, like physical bodies, change over time, in which case the soul theory faces an analogue problem of diachronic soul identity, or (b) souls, unlike physical bodies, do not change over time, in which case the soul theory cannot explain why souls relate to particular bodies over time and so at best only partially explains personal identity. I conclude that the soul theory fares no better than physicalist-friendly accounts of personal identity such as bodily- or psychological-continuity-based views. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11153-016-9594-x |
| format | Article |
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| language | eng |
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| source | JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings |
| subjects | Education Identity Logic Morality Non-Western Philosophy Philosophy Philosophy of Religion Religious Studies Self concept Soul Theology |
| title | A dilemma for the soul theory of personal identity |
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