Does Accounting Conservatism Mitigate the Shortcomings of CEO Overconfidence?

Overconfident CEOs are more willing to initiate investment projects that require experimentation, yet tend to defer responding to the bad news when the project is not performing as planned. Accounting conservatism accelerates the recognition of the bad news and its dissemination to gatekeepers, maki...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Accounting review 2017-11, Vol.92 (6), p.77-101
Hauptverfasser: Hsu, Charles, Novoselov, Kirill E., Wang, Rencheng
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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