DO FEDERAL DEFICITS MOTIVATE REGIONAL FISCAL (IM)BALANCES? EVIDENCE FOR THE SPANISH CASE
ABSTRACT This paper studies the vertical and horizontal interactions between federal and regional governments in terms of public deficits. Recent studies commonly restraint budget slippages to the incentives created by the institutional arrangements within a country. Alternatively, we estimate here...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of regional science 2018-01, Vol.58 (1), p.224-258 |
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| container_title | Journal of regional science |
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| creator | Molina‐Parra, Agustín Martínez‐López, Diego |
| description | ABSTRACT
This paper studies the vertical and horizontal interactions between federal and regional governments in terms of public deficits. Recent studies commonly restraint budget slippages to the incentives created by the institutional arrangements within a country. Alternatively, we estimate here a fiscal reaction function for the Spanish regions over the period 1995–2010, paying special attention to the impact of the federal fiscal stance on regional fiscal imbalances. Our results indicate that higher public deficits for the central government encourage larger fiscal imbalances at the regional level. This vertical interaction is interpreted in the context of yardstick competition models. We also find a significant impact from fiscal decisions taken by governments at the same decision‐making tier in a specific region. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/jors.12328 |
| format | Article |
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This paper studies the vertical and horizontal interactions between federal and regional governments in terms of public deficits. Recent studies commonly restraint budget slippages to the incentives created by the institutional arrangements within a country. Alternatively, we estimate here a fiscal reaction function for the Spanish regions over the period 1995–2010, paying special attention to the impact of the federal fiscal stance on regional fiscal imbalances. Our results indicate that higher public deficits for the central government encourage larger fiscal imbalances at the regional level. This vertical interaction is interpreted in the context of yardstick competition models. We also find a significant impact from fiscal decisions taken by governments at the same decision‐making tier in a specific region.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0022-4146</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1467-9787</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1111/jors.12328</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Heightstown: Blackwell Publishers Inc</publisher><subject>Budget deficits ; Central government ; Competition ; Decision making ; Deficits ; Incentives</subject><ispartof>Journal of regional science, 2018-01, Vol.58 (1), p.224-258</ispartof><rights>2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.</rights><rights>2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c3708-ce00baea2a673a33665add7d01544a5647f432275f18770a7716f01114b0ba063</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c3708-ce00baea2a673a33665add7d01544a5647f432275f18770a7716f01114b0ba063</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111%2Fjors.12328$$EPDF$$P50$$Gwiley$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111%2Fjors.12328$$EHTML$$P50$$Gwiley$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,1417,27865,27923,27924,45573,45574</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Molina‐Parra, Agustín</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Martínez‐López, Diego</creatorcontrib><title>DO FEDERAL DEFICITS MOTIVATE REGIONAL FISCAL (IM)BALANCES? EVIDENCE FOR THE SPANISH CASE</title><title>Journal of regional science</title><description>ABSTRACT
This paper studies the vertical and horizontal interactions between federal and regional governments in terms of public deficits. Recent studies commonly restraint budget slippages to the incentives created by the institutional arrangements within a country. Alternatively, we estimate here a fiscal reaction function for the Spanish regions over the period 1995–2010, paying special attention to the impact of the federal fiscal stance on regional fiscal imbalances. Our results indicate that higher public deficits for the central government encourage larger fiscal imbalances at the regional level. This vertical interaction is interpreted in the context of yardstick competition models. We also find a significant impact from fiscal decisions taken by governments at the same decision‐making tier in a specific region.</description><subject>Budget deficits</subject><subject>Central government</subject><subject>Competition</subject><subject>Decision making</subject><subject>Deficits</subject><subject>Incentives</subject><issn>0022-4146</issn><issn>1467-9787</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2018</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kE1PwkAQhjdGExG9-As28aImxf3ecjK13cIaoKZbibfNAm0CQYutxPDvXaxn5zKTmWfeybwAXGM0wD4eNnXTDjChJDwBPcyEDIYylKeghxAhAfOdc3DRthuEEGZM9MBbksFUJSqPJjBRqY51YeA0K_Q8KhTM1UhnMz9KtYl9utXTu6doEs1iZR6hmutE-RKmWQ6LsYLmJZppM4ZxZNQlOKvcti2v_nIfvKaqiMfBJBtprxUsqURhsCwRWrjSESckdZQKwd1qJVcIc8YcF0xWjBIieYVDKZGTEosK-VfZwu8hQfvgptPdNfXnvmy_7KbeNx_-pMXDUGBOOOWeuu-oZVO3bVNWdtes311zsBjZo3P26Jz9dc7DuIO_19vy8A9pn7PcdDs_Nntmhw</recordid><startdate>201801</startdate><enddate>201801</enddate><creator>Molina‐Parra, Agustín</creator><creator>Martínez‐López, Diego</creator><general>Blackwell Publishers Inc</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>201801</creationdate><title>DO FEDERAL DEFICITS MOTIVATE REGIONAL FISCAL (IM)BALANCES? EVIDENCE FOR THE SPANISH CASE</title><author>Molina‐Parra, Agustín ; Martínez‐López, Diego</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c3708-ce00baea2a673a33665add7d01544a5647f432275f18770a7716f01114b0ba063</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2018</creationdate><topic>Budget deficits</topic><topic>Central government</topic><topic>Competition</topic><topic>Decision making</topic><topic>Deficits</topic><topic>Incentives</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Molina‐Parra, Agustín</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Martínez‐López, Diego</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>PAIS Index</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>PAIS International</collection><collection>PAIS International (Ovid)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Journal of regional science</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Molina‐Parra, Agustín</au><au>Martínez‐López, Diego</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>DO FEDERAL DEFICITS MOTIVATE REGIONAL FISCAL (IM)BALANCES? EVIDENCE FOR THE SPANISH CASE</atitle><jtitle>Journal of regional science</jtitle><date>2018-01</date><risdate>2018</risdate><volume>58</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>224</spage><epage>258</epage><pages>224-258</pages><issn>0022-4146</issn><eissn>1467-9787</eissn><abstract>ABSTRACT
This paper studies the vertical and horizontal interactions between federal and regional governments in terms of public deficits. Recent studies commonly restraint budget slippages to the incentives created by the institutional arrangements within a country. Alternatively, we estimate here a fiscal reaction function for the Spanish regions over the period 1995–2010, paying special attention to the impact of the federal fiscal stance on regional fiscal imbalances. Our results indicate that higher public deficits for the central government encourage larger fiscal imbalances at the regional level. This vertical interaction is interpreted in the context of yardstick competition models. We also find a significant impact from fiscal decisions taken by governments at the same decision‐making tier in a specific region.</abstract><cop>Heightstown</cop><pub>Blackwell Publishers Inc</pub><doi>10.1111/jors.12328</doi><tpages>35</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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| ispartof | Journal of regional science, 2018-01, Vol.58 (1), p.224-258 |
| issn | 0022-4146 1467-9787 |
| language | eng |
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| source | PAIS Index; Business Source Complete; Wiley Online Library All Journals |
| subjects | Budget deficits Central government Competition Decision making Deficits Incentives |
| title | DO FEDERAL DEFICITS MOTIVATE REGIONAL FISCAL (IM)BALANCES? EVIDENCE FOR THE SPANISH CASE |
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