PERSUASION OF A PRIVATELY INFORMED RECEIVER

We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment to disclose information about a payoff-relevant state. A persuasion mechanism conditions information disclosure on the receiv...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Econometrica 2017-11, Vol.85 (6), p.1949-1964
Hauptverfasser:	Kolotilin, Anton, Mylovanov, Tymofiy, Zapechelnyuk, Andriy, Li, Ming
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Bayesian persuasion Disclosure experiments information design information disclosure Information management mechanism design without transfers NOTES AND COMMENTS Persuasion persuasion mechanisms
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