FAIR ALLOCATION OF DISPUTED PROPERTIES
We model problems of allocating disputed properties as generalized exchange economies. Therein, agents have preferences and claims over multiple goods, and the social endowment of each good may not be sufficient to satisfy all individual claims. We focus on market-based allocation rules that impose...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | International economic review (Philadelphia) 2017-11, Vol.58 (4), p.1279-1301 |
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| container_issue | 4 |
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| container_title | International economic review (Philadelphia) |
| container_volume | 58 |
| creator | Ju, Biung-Ghi Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. |
| description | We model problems of allocating disputed properties as generalized exchange economies. Therein, agents have preferences and claims over multiple goods, and the social endowment of each good may not be sufficient to satisfy all individual claims. We focus on market-based allocation rules that impose a two-step procedure: assignment of rights based on claims first and voluntary exchange based on the assigned rights afterward. We characterize three focal egalitarian rights-assignment rules that guarantee that the allocation rules are fair. We apply our results to problems of greenhouse gas emissions and contested water rights. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/iere.12251 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
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| ispartof | International economic review (Philadelphia), 2017-11, Vol.58 (4), p.1279-1301 |
| issn | 0020-6598 1468-2354 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_1969024835 |
| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete; Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Allocations Assignment Economic theory Egalitarianism Greenhouse gases Water resources Water rights |
| title | FAIR ALLOCATION OF DISPUTED PROPERTIES |
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