Carroll's Regress and the Epistemology of Logic

On an internalist account of logical inference, we are warranted in drawing conclusions from accepted premises on the basis of our knowledge of logical laws. Lewis Carroll's regress challenges internalism by purporting to show that this kind of warrant cannot ground the move from premises to co...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Philosophical studies 2007-05, Vol.134 (2), p.183-210
1. Verfasser:	Philie, Patrice
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Epistemology Externalism Inference Internalism Knowledge Logic Logical form Modus ponens Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language Philosophy Reasoning Rules of inference Skepticism
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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