Trading with Bandits
Is it possible to trade with bandits? When government is absent, the superior strength of some agents makes it cheaper for them to violently steal what they desire from weaker agents than to use trade to obtain what they want. Such was the case with middlemen who interacted with producers in late pr...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Journal of law & economics 2007-05, Vol.50 (2), p.303-321 |
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| container_title | The Journal of law & economics |
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| creator | Leeson, Peter T. |
| description | Is it possible to trade with bandits? When government is absent, the superior strength of some agents makes it cheaper for them to violently steal what they desire from weaker agents than to use trade to obtain what they want. Such was the case with middlemen who interacted with producers in late precolonial west central Africa. In the face of this threat, producers employed two mechanisms to make exchange with middlemen possible. On the one hand, they used credit to alter middlemen’s cost‐benefit structure of engaging in plunder versus trade. On the other hand, producers demanded tribute from traveling traders as a risk premium. By transforming traveling traders’ incentive from banditry to peaceful trade and reducing producers’ costs associated with interacting with middlemen, these mechanisms enhanced both parties’ ability to capture the gains from exchange. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1086/511320 |
| format | Article |
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When government is absent, the superior strength of some agents makes it cheaper for them to violently steal what they desire from weaker agents than to use trade to obtain what they want. Such was the case with middlemen who interacted with producers in late precolonial west central Africa. In the face of this threat, producers employed two mechanisms to make exchange with middlemen possible. On the one hand, they used credit to alter middlemen’s cost‐benefit structure of engaging in plunder versus trade. On the other hand, producers demanded tribute from traveling traders as a risk premium. By transforming traveling traders’ incentive from banditry to peaceful trade and reducing producers’ costs associated with interacting with middlemen, these mechanisms enhanced both parties’ ability to capture the gains from exchange.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0022-2186</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1537-5285</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1086/511320</identifier><identifier>CODEN: JLLEA7</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Chicago: The University of Chicago Press</publisher><subject>Banditry ; Colonial history ; Communities ; Cost benefit analysis ; Credit ; Economic analysis ; Economic history ; Economic statistics ; Economic theory ; International trade ; Larceny ; Middlemen ; Monopoly ; Multilateralism ; Risk premiums ; Rule of law ; Slaves ; Studies ; Theft ; Trade ; Trade intermediaries ; Travelers ; Violence ; West Africa</subject><ispartof>The Journal of law & economics, 2007-05, Vol.50 (2), p.303-321</ispartof><rights>2007 by The University of Chicago. 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By transforming traveling traders’ incentive from banditry to peaceful trade and reducing producers’ costs associated with interacting with middlemen, these mechanisms enhanced both parties’ ability to capture the gains from exchange.</description><subject>Banditry</subject><subject>Colonial history</subject><subject>Communities</subject><subject>Cost benefit analysis</subject><subject>Credit</subject><subject>Economic analysis</subject><subject>Economic history</subject><subject>Economic statistics</subject><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>International trade</subject><subject>Larceny</subject><subject>Middlemen</subject><subject>Monopoly</subject><subject>Multilateralism</subject><subject>Risk premiums</subject><subject>Rule of law</subject><subject>Slaves</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Theft</subject><subject>Trade</subject><subject>Trade intermediaries</subject><subject>Travelers</subject><subject>Violence</subject><subject>West Africa</subject><issn>0022-2186</issn><issn>1537-5285</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2007</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNpd0EtLw0AQwPFFFIxVTx49FBFv0Z19Zfdoiy8oeKnnZbOPNqVN4m6C-O2NRFpwLnP58WcYhC4B3wOW4oEDUIKPUAacFjknkh-jDGNCcgJSnKKzlDZ4GKZYhq6W0biqXk2_qm49nZnaVV06RyfBbJO_-NsT9PH8tJy_5ov3l7f54yK3VNEuBwpOgAXFJTDMvCudYWVhmZOWhwKCUbzkQUKQplREWBNUKaSTmAWplKQTdDd229h89j51elcl67dbU_umT5qKgnAOZIA3_-Cm6WM93KZBCQaSM3yo2dikFH3Qbax2Jn5rwPr3M3r8zABvR9jbdWXNqmmjT-mQ3LPrkW1S18R9jDElMQX6A7IXZ_g</recordid><startdate>20070501</startdate><enddate>20070501</enddate><creator>Leeson, Peter T.</creator><general>The University of Chicago Press</general><general>University of Chicago Law School</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K7.</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20070501</creationdate><title>Trading with Bandits</title><author>Leeson, Peter T.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c393t-131d61c19581404edbda4b7c4d8c5f71fa95b5f81f8ab926caf9b68d804f89983</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2007</creationdate><topic>Banditry</topic><topic>Colonial history</topic><topic>Communities</topic><topic>Cost benefit analysis</topic><topic>Credit</topic><topic>Economic analysis</topic><topic>Economic history</topic><topic>Economic statistics</topic><topic>Economic theory</topic><topic>International trade</topic><topic>Larceny</topic><topic>Middlemen</topic><topic>Monopoly</topic><topic>Multilateralism</topic><topic>Risk premiums</topic><topic>Rule of law</topic><topic>Slaves</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Theft</topic><topic>Trade</topic><topic>Trade intermediaries</topic><topic>Travelers</topic><topic>Violence</topic><topic>West Africa</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Leeson, Peter T.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Criminal Justice (Alumni)</collection><jtitle>The Journal of law & economics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Leeson, Peter T.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Trading with Bandits</atitle><jtitle>The Journal of law & economics</jtitle><date>2007-05-01</date><risdate>2007</risdate><volume>50</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>303</spage><epage>321</epage><pages>303-321</pages><issn>0022-2186</issn><eissn>1537-5285</eissn><coden>JLLEA7</coden><abstract>Is it possible to trade with bandits? When government is absent, the superior strength of some agents makes it cheaper for them to violently steal what they desire from weaker agents than to use trade to obtain what they want. Such was the case with middlemen who interacted with producers in late precolonial west central Africa. In the face of this threat, producers employed two mechanisms to make exchange with middlemen possible. On the one hand, they used credit to alter middlemen’s cost‐benefit structure of engaging in plunder versus trade. On the other hand, producers demanded tribute from traveling traders as a risk premium. By transforming traveling traders’ incentive from banditry to peaceful trade and reducing producers’ costs associated with interacting with middlemen, these mechanisms enhanced both parties’ ability to capture the gains from exchange.</abstract><cop>Chicago</cop><pub>The University of Chicago Press</pub><doi>10.1086/511320</doi><tpages>19</tpages></addata></record> |
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| ispartof | The Journal of law & economics, 2007-05, Vol.50 (2), p.303-321 |
| issn | 0022-2186 1537-5285 |
| language | eng |
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| source | HeinOnline Law Journal Library; Jstor Complete Legacy; University of Chicago Press Journals (Full run) |
| subjects | Banditry Colonial history Communities Cost benefit analysis Credit Economic analysis Economic history Economic statistics Economic theory International trade Larceny Middlemen Monopoly Multilateralism Risk premiums Rule of law Slaves Studies Theft Trade Trade intermediaries Travelers Violence West Africa |
| title | Trading with Bandits |
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