EPISTEMIC REACTIVE ATTITUDES
Although there have been a number of recent discussions about the emotions that we bring with us to our epistemic endeavors, there has been little, if any, discussion of the emotions we bring with us to epistemic appraisal. This paper focuses on a particular set of emotions, the reactive attitudes....
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| Veröffentlicht in: | American philosophical quarterly (Oxford) 2017-10, Vol.54 (4), p.353-366 |
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| container_end_page | 366 |
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| container_title | American philosophical quarterly (Oxford) |
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| creator | Tollefsen, Deborah Perron |
| description | Although there have been a number of recent discussions about the emotions that we bring with us to our epistemic endeavors, there has been little, if any, discussion of the emotions we bring with us to epistemic appraisal. This paper focuses on a particular set of emotions, the reactive attitudes. As Peter F. Strawson and others have argued, our reactive attitudes reveal something deep about our moral commitments. A similar argument can be made within the domain of epistemology. Our "epistemic reactive attitudes" reveal our epistemic commitments. Reflection on the role they play in our practice of epistemic appraisal can contribute to a number of different debates in contemporary epistemology, including the nature of epistemic norms and epistemic responsibility. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.2307/45128587 |
| format | Article |
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| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; Alma/SFX Local Collection |
| subjects | Appraisal Attitudes Emotions Epistemology Morality Philosophy Strawson, Peter F |
| title | EPISTEMIC REACTIVE ATTITUDES |
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