Levels of Explanation Vindicated

Marr’s celebrated contribution to cognitive science (Marr 1982 , chap. 1) was the introduction of (at least) three levels of description/explanation. However, most contemporary research has relegated the distinction between levels to a rather dispensable remark. Ignoring such an important contributi...

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Veröffentlicht in:Review of philosophy and psychology 2011-03, Vol.2 (1), p.77-88
Hauptverfasser: Verdejo, Víctor M., Quesada, Daniel
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description Marr’s celebrated contribution to cognitive science (Marr 1982 , chap. 1) was the introduction of (at least) three levels of description/explanation. However, most contemporary research has relegated the distinction between levels to a rather dispensable remark. Ignoring such an important contribution comes at a price, or so we shall argue. In the present paper, first we review Marr’s main points and motivations regarding levels of explanation. Second, we examine two cases in which the distinction between levels has been neglected when considering the structure of mental representations: Cummins et al.’s distinction between structural representation and encodings (Cummins in Journal of Philosophy, 93(12):591–614, 1996 ; Cummins et al. in Journal of Philosophical Research, 30:405–408, 2001 ) and Fodor’s account of iconic representation (Fodor 2008 ). These two cases illustrate the kind of problems in which researchers can find themselves if they overlook distinctions between levels and how easily these problems can be solved when levels are carefully examined. The analysis of these cases allows us to conclude that researchers in the cognitive sciences are well advised to avoid risks of confusion by respecting Marr’s old lesson.
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subjects Cognitive Psychology
Developmental Psychology
Education
Epistemology
Neurosciences
Philosophy
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Science
Researchers
title Levels of Explanation Vindicated
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