Vague Credence
It is natural to think of precise probabilities as being special cases of imprecise probabilities, the special case being when one’s lower and upper probabilities are equal. I argue, however, that it is better to think of the two models as representing two different aspects of our credences, which a...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Synthese (Dordrecht) 2017-10, Vol.194 (10), p.3931-3954 |
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| creator | Lyon, Aidan |
| description | It is natural to think of precise probabilities as being special cases of imprecise probabilities, the special case being when one’s lower and upper probabilities are equal. I argue, however, that it is better to think of the two models as representing two different aspects of our credences, which are often (if not always) vague to some degree. I show that by combining the two models into one model, and understanding that model as a model of vague credence, a natural interpretation arises that suggests a hypothesis concerning how we can improve the accuracy of aggregate credences. I present empirical results in support of this hypothesis. I also discuss how this modeling interpretation of imprecise probabilities bears upon a philosophical objection that has been raised against them, the so-called inductive learning problem. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11229-015-0782-5 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Synthese (Dordrecht), 2017-10, Vol.194 (10), p.3931-3954 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | SpringerLink Journals; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing |
| subjects | Belief & doubt Credibility Education Epistemology Hypotheses Learning Logic Metaphysics Philosophy Philosophy of Language Philosophy of Science Probability S.I. : Vagueness and Probability |
| title | Vague Credence |
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