International asymmetric R&D rivalry and industrial strategy
This study models an international duopoly under "asymmetrical" R&D investment rivalry, in which a firm from a cost-reducing country (CRC) conducts process R&D investment, a firm from a quality-improving country (QIC) makes product R&D investment, and the governments in the res...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of economics (Vienna, Austria) Austria), 2017-11, Vol.122 (3), p.267-278 |
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| creator | Ishii, Yasunori |
| description | This study models an international duopoly under "asymmetrical" R&D investment rivalry, in which a firm from a cost-reducing country (CRC) conducts process R&D investment, a firm from a quality-improving country (QIC) makes product R&D investment, and the governments in the respective countries implement R&D policies for their own firms. We analyze the relationship between firms' R&D investment-price decisions and governments' R&D policies. We find that an increase in the process (product) R&D investment subsidy of the CRC (QIC) raises the process (product) R&D investment of its firm, but reduces the product (process) R&D investment of its rival firm, and vice versa. We also show that, while an increase in the process (product) R&D investment of the CRC's (QIC's) firm increases its output, it decreases its rival's output, and vice versa. Furthermore, we demonstrate that, while an increase in the process R&D investment of the CRC's firm reduces the prices of both firms, an increase in the product R&D investment of the QIC's firm raises its own price, but reduces its rival's, and vice versa. Finally, we find that the optimal R&D investment policies of both countries are subsidy policies, when their firms act under asymmetrical R&D investment rivalry. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s00712-017-0548-2 |
| format | Article |
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We analyze the relationship between firms' R&D investment-price decisions and governments' R&D policies. We find that an increase in the process (product) R&D investment subsidy of the CRC (QIC) raises the process (product) R&D investment of its firm, but reduces the product (process) R&D investment of its rival firm, and vice versa. We also show that, while an increase in the process (product) R&D investment of the CRC's (QIC's) firm increases its output, it decreases its rival's output, and vice versa. Furthermore, we demonstrate that, while an increase in the process R&D investment of the CRC's firm reduces the prices of both firms, an increase in the product R&D investment of the QIC's firm raises its own price, but reduces its rival's, and vice versa. Finally, we find that the optimal R&D investment policies of both countries are subsidy policies, when their firms act under asymmetrical R&D investment rivalry.]]></description><identifier>ISSN: 0931-8658</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1617-7134</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1007/s00712-017-0548-2</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Vienna: Springer</publisher><subject>Companies ; Competition ; Duopoly ; Economic models ; Economic theory ; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods ; Economics ; Economics and Finance ; Game Theory ; Investment policy ; Investments ; Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics ; Microeconomics ; Policy making ; Prices ; Public Finance ; R&D ; Research & development ; Social and Behav. 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We analyze the relationship between firms' R&D investment-price decisions and governments' R&D policies. We find that an increase in the process (product) R&D investment subsidy of the CRC (QIC) raises the process (product) R&D investment of its firm, but reduces the product (process) R&D investment of its rival firm, and vice versa. We also show that, while an increase in the process (product) R&D investment of the CRC's (QIC's) firm increases its output, it decreases its rival's output, and vice versa. Furthermore, we demonstrate that, while an increase in the process R&D investment of the CRC's firm reduces the prices of both firms, an increase in the product R&D investment of the QIC's firm raises its own price, but reduces its rival's, and vice versa. Finally, we find that the optimal R&D investment policies of both countries are subsidy policies, when their firms act under asymmetrical R&D investment rivalry.]]></description><subject>Companies</subject><subject>Competition</subject><subject>Duopoly</subject><subject>Economic models</subject><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods</subject><subject>Economics</subject><subject>Economics and Finance</subject><subject>Game Theory</subject><subject>Investment policy</subject><subject>Investments</subject><subject>Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics</subject><subject>Microeconomics</subject><subject>Policy making</subject><subject>Prices</subject><subject>Public Finance</subject><subject>R&D</subject><subject>Research & development</subject><subject>Social and Behav. 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We analyze the relationship between firms' R&D investment-price decisions and governments' R&D policies. We find that an increase in the process (product) R&D investment subsidy of the CRC (QIC) raises the process (product) R&D investment of its firm, but reduces the product (process) R&D investment of its rival firm, and vice versa. We also show that, while an increase in the process (product) R&D investment of the CRC's (QIC's) firm increases its output, it decreases its rival's output, and vice versa. Furthermore, we demonstrate that, while an increase in the process R&D investment of the CRC's firm reduces the prices of both firms, an increase in the product R&D investment of the QIC's firm raises its own price, but reduces its rival's, and vice versa. Finally, we find that the optimal R&D investment policies of both countries are subsidy policies, when their firms act under asymmetrical R&D investment rivalry.]]></abstract><cop>Vienna</cop><pub>Springer</pub><doi>10.1007/s00712-017-0548-2</doi><tpages>12</tpages></addata></record> |
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| subjects | Companies Competition Duopoly Economic models Economic theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Game Theory Investment policy Investments Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics Microeconomics Policy making Prices Public Finance R&D Research & development Social and Behav. Sciences Subsidies Vice |
| title | International asymmetric R&D rivalry and industrial strategy |
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