Generic Gӧdel’s Incompleteness Theorem

Gӧdel’s incompleteness theorem asserts that if formal arithmetic is consistent then there exists an arithmetic statement such that neither the statement nor its negation can be deduced from the axioms of formal arithmetic. Previously [ 3 ], it was proved that formal arithmetic remains incomplete if,...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Algebra and logic 2017-07, Vol.56 (3), p.232-235
1. Verfasser:	Rybalov, A. N.
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Schlagworte:	Algebra Arithmetic Axioms Mathematical Logic and Foundations Mathematics Mathematics and Statistics Theorems
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description	Gӧdel’s incompleteness theorem asserts that if formal arithmetic is consistent then there exists an arithmetic statement such that neither the statement nor its negation can be deduced from the axioms of formal arithmetic. Previously [ 3 ], it was proved that formal arithmetic remains incomplete if, instead of the set of all arithmetic statements, we consider any set of some class of “almost all” statements (the class of so-called strongly generic subsets). This result is strengthened as follows: formal arithmetic is incomplete for any generic subset of arithmetic statements (i.e., a subset of asymptotic density 1).
doi_str_mv	10.1007/s10469-017-9442-9
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N.</creator><creatorcontrib>Rybalov, A. N.</creatorcontrib><description>Gӧdel’s incompleteness theorem asserts that if formal arithmetic is consistent then there exists an arithmetic statement such that neither the statement nor its negation can be deduced from the axioms of formal arithmetic. Previously [ 3 ], it was proved that formal arithmetic remains incomplete if, instead of the set of all arithmetic statements, we consider any set of some class of “almost all” statements (the class of so-called strongly generic subsets). 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N.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><jtitle>Algebra and logic</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Rybalov, A. N.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Generic Gӧdel’s Incompleteness Theorem</atitle><jtitle>Algebra and logic</jtitle><stitle>Algebra Logic</stitle><date>2017-07-01</date><risdate>2017</risdate><volume>56</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>232</spage><epage>235</epage><pages>232-235</pages><issn>0002-5232</issn><eissn>1573-8302</eissn><abstract>Gӧdel’s incompleteness theorem asserts that if formal arithmetic is consistent then there exists an arithmetic statement such that neither the statement nor its negation can be deduced from the axioms of formal arithmetic. Previously [ 3 ], it was proved that formal arithmetic remains incomplete if, instead of the set of all arithmetic statements, we consider any set of some class of “almost all” statements (the class of so-called strongly generic subsets). This result is strengthened as follows: formal arithmetic is incomplete for any generic subset of arithmetic statements (i.e., a subset of asymptotic density 1).</abstract><cop>New York</cop><pub>Springer US</pub><doi>10.1007/s10469-017-9442-9</doi><tpages>4</tpages></addata></record>
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title	Generic Gӧdel’s Incompleteness Theorem
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