A Model of Dynamic Takeover Behavior

Several observed features of takeover contests appear to be inconsistent with value-maximizing behavior on the part of the agents involved. For instance, managers occasionally resist takeover bids, presumably in order to facilitate competition among bidders. However, counterbids do not always materi...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Journal of finance (New York) 1986-06, Vol.41 (2), p.465-480
Hauptverfasser:	GIAMMARINO, RONALD M., HEINKEL, ROBERT L.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Acquisitions & mergers Behavior Bidding Contests Economic competition Information asymmetry Information economics Market prices Mathematical analysis Nash equilibrium Settlement counteroffers Shareholders Stock prices Target company Tender offers
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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