Information disclosure and asymmetric speed of learning in booms and busts

We consider a model in which agents gradually learn about the aggregate market conditions — ‘boom’ or ‘bust’ — from the information disclosed after a trading round. The disclosure rules can generate asymmetric learning and affect the degree of asymmetry. In particular, when only winning bids are pub...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Economics letters 2017-09, Vol.158, p.37-40
Hauptverfasser:	Palazzo, Francesco, Zhang, Min
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Asymmetric learning Asymmetry Disclosure Economic models Information Information disclosure Learning Studies Trading
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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