Information disclosure and asymmetric speed of learning in booms and busts
We consider a model in which agents gradually learn about the aggregate market conditions — ‘boom’ or ‘bust’ — from the information disclosed after a trading round. The disclosure rules can generate asymmetric learning and affect the degree of asymmetry. In particular, when only winning bids are pub...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Economics letters 2017-09, Vol.158, p.37-40 |
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| container_title | Economics letters |
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| creator | Palazzo, Francesco Zhang, Min |
| description | We consider a model in which agents gradually learn about the aggregate market conditions — ‘boom’ or ‘bust’ — from the information disclosed after a trading round. The disclosure rules can generate asymmetric learning and affect the degree of asymmetry. In particular, when only winning bids are publicly disclosed, learning is more rapid in a bust.
•We analyze how information disclosure affects learning speed in booms and busts.•We give a formal condition on what type of information leads to asymmetric learning.•Learning is faster in a bust when only the winning bids are disclosed. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.06.027 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0165-1765 |
| ispartof | Economics letters, 2017-09, Vol.158, p.37-40 |
| issn | 0165-1765 1873-7374 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_1944223079 |
| source | Access via ScienceDirect (Elsevier) |
| subjects | Asymmetric learning Asymmetry Disclosure Economic models Information Information disclosure Learning Studies Trading |
| title | Information disclosure and asymmetric speed of learning in booms and busts |
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