Subsidising liquidity or subsidising markets? Safe harbors, derivatives, and finance
In my experience, financial market participants simply would not enter into certain Safe Harbored Contracts without the protection afforded by the safe harbors . . Because of the direct and dramatic effect that eliminating or substantially narrowing the safe harbors would have on markets for Safe Ha...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The American bankruptcy law journal 2017-06, Vol.91 (3), p.463 |
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description | In my experience, financial market participants simply would not enter into certain Safe Harbored Contracts without the protection afforded by the safe harbors . . Because of the direct and dramatic effect that eliminating or substantially narrowing the safe harbors would have on markets for Safe Harbored Contracts, a decision to proceed with such revisions equates to a determination that these marķēts do not provide value to the financial system or the broader economy and thus can be curtailed or eliminated.5 In short, the safe harbors created the derivatives markets, and without the safe harbors the markets would disappear or massively shrink.6 Whether the repeal or narrowing of the safe harbors would represent the judgment expressed in the highlighted section, or would instead represent other judg' ments - such as a belief that the derivatives market should play by the same basic rules as other financial markets, or that the costs of the safe harbors outweigh the value of the markets created thereby7 - is unclear. [...]Professor Paech argues that the safe harbors increase the efficient use of regulatory capital, because banks are allowed to calculate their capital on the basis of net, rather than gross, credit risk exposures.61 The secured credit-like nature of the safe harbors again raises the issue of cost. [...]one might question how much practical relevance the continental European jurisdictions have to the global derivatives markets, given the comparatively small number of trades occurring within these jurisdictions. [...]for every jurisdiction like Belgium that Professor Paech points to, a critic of the safe harbors can point to a jurisdiction like Canada where secured creditors are subject to the stay imposed in Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings.67 For every Germany, there is a Japan.68 More generally, there is the question of what liquidity means in the derivatives context. According to securities dealers, their hope is that the bankruptcy court's treatment of repos between Lombard-Wall and Dauphine will not be widely viewed as a precedent. 1 Judge Ryan's law clerk said yesterday that the judge intended to prepare a written decision on the Dauphine repos but not until he has received comments from interested parties. |
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Because of the direct and dramatic effect that eliminating or substantially narrowing the safe harbors would have on markets for Safe Harbored Contracts, a decision to proceed with such revisions equates to a determination that these marķēts do not provide value to the financial system or the broader economy and thus can be curtailed or eliminated.5 In short, the safe harbors created the derivatives markets, and without the safe harbors the markets would disappear or massively shrink.6 Whether the repeal or narrowing of the safe harbors would represent the judgment expressed in the highlighted section, or would instead represent other judg' ments - such as a belief that the derivatives market should play by the same basic rules as other financial markets, or that the costs of the safe harbors outweigh the value of the markets created thereby7 - is unclear. [...]Professor Paech argues that the safe harbors increase the efficient use of regulatory capital, because banks are allowed to calculate their capital on the basis of net, rather than gross, credit risk exposures.61 The secured credit-like nature of the safe harbors again raises the issue of cost. [...]one might question how much practical relevance the continental European jurisdictions have to the global derivatives markets, given the comparatively small number of trades occurring within these jurisdictions. [...]for every jurisdiction like Belgium that Professor Paech points to, a critic of the safe harbors can point to a jurisdiction like Canada where secured creditors are subject to the stay imposed in Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings.67 For every Germany, there is a Japan.68 More generally, there is the question of what liquidity means in the derivatives context. According to securities dealers, their hope is that the bankruptcy court's treatment of repos between Lombard-Wall and Dauphine will not be widely viewed as a precedent. 1 Judge Ryan's law clerk said yesterday that the judge intended to prepare a written decision on the Dauphine repos but not until he has received comments from interested parties.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0027-9048</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Ft. 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Because of the direct and dramatic effect that eliminating or substantially narrowing the safe harbors would have on markets for Safe Harbored Contracts, a decision to proceed with such revisions equates to a determination that these marķēts do not provide value to the financial system or the broader economy and thus can be curtailed or eliminated.5 In short, the safe harbors created the derivatives markets, and without the safe harbors the markets would disappear or massively shrink.6 Whether the repeal or narrowing of the safe harbors would represent the judgment expressed in the highlighted section, or would instead represent other judg' ments - such as a belief that the derivatives market should play by the same basic rules as other financial markets, or that the costs of the safe harbors outweigh the value of the markets created thereby7 - is unclear. [...]Professor Paech argues that the safe harbors increase the efficient use of regulatory capital, because banks are allowed to calculate their capital on the basis of net, rather than gross, credit risk exposures.61 The secured credit-like nature of the safe harbors again raises the issue of cost. [...]one might question how much practical relevance the continental European jurisdictions have to the global derivatives markets, given the comparatively small number of trades occurring within these jurisdictions. [...]for every jurisdiction like Belgium that Professor Paech points to, a critic of the safe harbors can point to a jurisdiction like Canada where secured creditors are subject to the stay imposed in Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings.67 For every Germany, there is a Japan.68 More generally, there is the question of what liquidity means in the derivatives context. According to securities dealers, their hope is that the bankruptcy court's treatment of repos between Lombard-Wall and Dauphine will not be widely viewed as a precedent. 1 Judge Ryan's law clerk said yesterday that the judge intended to prepare a written decision on the Dauphine repos but not until he has received comments from interested parties.</description><subject>Bankruptcy</subject><subject>Bankruptcy laws</subject><subject>Bankruptcy reorganization</subject><subject>Central banks</subject><subject>Corporate reorganization</subject><subject>Costs</subject><subject>Derivatives</subject><subject>Derivatives (Financial instruments)</subject><subject>Federal court decisions</subject><subject>Finance</subject><subject>Financial instruments</subject><subject>Going concerns</subject><subject>Insolvency</subject><subject>Laws, regulations and rules</subject><subject>Over the counter trading</subject><subject>Remedies</subject><subject>Repurchase agreements</subject><subject>Safe harbor</subject><subject>Securities markets</subject><subject>Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act 2010-US</subject><issn>0027-9048</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2017</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>N95</sourceid><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><recordid>eNptkEtrwzAMgHPYYF23_2DYtRlyHo1zGqXsBYUd2p2D4sipu9RZraSwfz_DBuugCPT8JCFdRBOApIhLyNRVdM28AwBZZukk2qzHmm1j2bpWdPYwBn_4Er0XfFLYo_-ggR_EGg2JLfq69zwTDXl7xMEeKQToGmGsQ6fpJro02DHd_tpp9P70uFm-xKu359flYhW3aZIPMSIqo6UuCAxoXeapLLI8zags5lpLQ1qiLmut51kCoKSEHAsJCuaoZI5ZOo3ufuZ--v4wEg_Vrh-9CyurcB1AGaapP6rFjirrTD941HvLulrkkKeQSCUDFZ-hWnLksesdGRvS__j7M3yQhvZWn22YnTTUY3gscVBs2-3ALY7Mp_g3tqiF4A</recordid><startdate>20170622</startdate><enddate>20170622</enddate><creator>Lubben, Stephen J</creator><general>National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges</general><scope>N95</scope><scope>XI7</scope><scope>ILT</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>885</scope><scope>8AO</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ANIOZ</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FRAZJ</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>M1F</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PADUT</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>Q9U</scope><scope>S0X</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20170622</creationdate><title>Subsidising liquidity or subsidising markets? Safe harbors, derivatives, and finance</title><author>Lubben, Stephen J</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-g325t-aaa8fc1c7e0f0cc953174534e976cc1fec1ac9bcc6420081105a710806a815a43</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2017</creationdate><topic>Bankruptcy</topic><topic>Bankruptcy laws</topic><topic>Bankruptcy reorganization</topic><topic>Central banks</topic><topic>Corporate reorganization</topic><topic>Costs</topic><topic>Derivatives</topic><topic>Derivatives (Financial instruments)</topic><topic>Federal court decisions</topic><topic>Finance</topic><topic>Financial instruments</topic><topic>Going concerns</topic><topic>Insolvency</topic><topic>Laws, regulations and rules</topic><topic>Over the counter trading</topic><topic>Remedies</topic><topic>Repurchase agreements</topic><topic>Safe harbor</topic><topic>Securities markets</topic><topic>Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act 2010-US</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Lubben, Stephen J</creatorcontrib><collection>Gale Business: Insights</collection><collection>Business Insights: Essentials</collection><collection>Gale OneFile: LegalTrac</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>Banking Information Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Pharma Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>Research Library (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>Accounting, Tax & Banking Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>Accounting, Tax & Banking Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>Research Library Prep</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced</collection><collection>Banking Information Database</collection><collection>Research Library</collection><collection>Research Library (Corporate)</collection><collection>Research Library China</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central China</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><collection>SIRS Editorial</collection><jtitle>The American bankruptcy law journal</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Lubben, Stephen J</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Subsidising liquidity or subsidising markets? Safe harbors, derivatives, and finance</atitle><jtitle>The American bankruptcy law journal</jtitle><date>2017-06-22</date><risdate>2017</risdate><volume>91</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>463</spage><pages>463-</pages><issn>0027-9048</issn><abstract>In my experience, financial market participants simply would not enter into certain Safe Harbored Contracts without the protection afforded by the safe harbors . . Because of the direct and dramatic effect that eliminating or substantially narrowing the safe harbors would have on markets for Safe Harbored Contracts, a decision to proceed with such revisions equates to a determination that these marķēts do not provide value to the financial system or the broader economy and thus can be curtailed or eliminated.5 In short, the safe harbors created the derivatives markets, and without the safe harbors the markets would disappear or massively shrink.6 Whether the repeal or narrowing of the safe harbors would represent the judgment expressed in the highlighted section, or would instead represent other judg' ments - such as a belief that the derivatives market should play by the same basic rules as other financial markets, or that the costs of the safe harbors outweigh the value of the markets created thereby7 - is unclear. [...]Professor Paech argues that the safe harbors increase the efficient use of regulatory capital, because banks are allowed to calculate their capital on the basis of net, rather than gross, credit risk exposures.61 The secured credit-like nature of the safe harbors again raises the issue of cost. [...]one might question how much practical relevance the continental European jurisdictions have to the global derivatives markets, given the comparatively small number of trades occurring within these jurisdictions. [...]for every jurisdiction like Belgium that Professor Paech points to, a critic of the safe harbors can point to a jurisdiction like Canada where secured creditors are subject to the stay imposed in Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings.67 For every Germany, there is a Japan.68 More generally, there is the question of what liquidity means in the derivatives context. According to securities dealers, their hope is that the bankruptcy court's treatment of repos between Lombard-Wall and Dauphine will not be widely viewed as a precedent. 1 Judge Ryan's law clerk said yesterday that the judge intended to prepare a written decision on the Dauphine repos but not until he has received comments from interested parties.</abstract><cop>Ft. Wayne</cop><pub>National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges</pub></addata></record> |
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subjects | Bankruptcy Bankruptcy laws Bankruptcy reorganization Central banks Corporate reorganization Costs Derivatives Derivatives (Financial instruments) Federal court decisions Finance Financial instruments Going concerns Insolvency Laws, regulations and rules Over the counter trading Remedies Repurchase agreements Safe harbor Securities markets Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act 2010-US |
title | Subsidising liquidity or subsidising markets? Safe harbors, derivatives, and finance |
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