A Governance Study of Corporate Ownership in the Insurance Industry
This study focuses on family control and ownership patterns in the U.S. insurance industry. Conflicting theories argue that family firms perform worse due to nepotism and weak risk-bearing attributes (Agency theory) or that family firms perform better because the unity of ownership and control reduc...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of insurance issues 2017-04, Vol.40 (1), p.23-60 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 60 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 1 |
| container_start_page | 23 |
| container_title | Journal of insurance issues |
| container_volume | 40 |
| creator | Pooser, David M. Wang, Ping Barrese, James |
| description | This study focuses on family control and ownership patterns in the U.S. insurance industry. Conflicting theories argue that family firms perform worse due to nepotism and weak risk-bearing attributes (Agency theory) or that family firms perform better because the unity of ownership and control reduces agency expenses (Stewardship theory). Our findings support the Stewardship view of the firm. Our findings also demonstrate that CEO-Chairperson duality improves performance but that the combination of family and duality is sub-optimal. We further study implications of institutional investor and insider ownership, compensation structure, and leverage on performance. |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_1925689737</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>44160925</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>44160925</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-g167t-350bbb49f9877db4af3f3b155beab10649f504347ec867259879c79c7f53c6383</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNotzs1KxDAUBeAgCtbRRxACrgtJbn6a5VB0LAzMQl2Xpk2dljGpSar07a2OcOEszsfhXqCMAbCcM84vUUYF0FwSJa_RTYwjIZSBlhkqt3jnv2xwjWstfklzt2Df49KHyYcmWXz4djbE4zDhweF0tLhycQ5_unLdHFNYbtFV35yivfvPDXp7enwtn_P9YVeV233-TqVKOQhijOG614VSneFNDz0YKoSxjaFEro0gHLiybSEVEyvT7e_1AloJBWzQw3l3Cv5ztjHVo5_Xz0-xppoJWWgFalX3ZzXG5EM9heGjCUvNOZVkVfADBY9QMQ</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1925689737</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>A Governance Study of Corporate Ownership in the Insurance Industry</title><source>Jstor Complete Legacy</source><source>Business Source Complete</source><creator>Pooser, David M. ; Wang, Ping ; Barrese, James</creator><creatorcontrib>Pooser, David M. ; Wang, Ping ; Barrese, James</creatorcontrib><description>This study focuses on family control and ownership patterns in the U.S. insurance industry. Conflicting theories argue that family firms perform worse due to nepotism and weak risk-bearing attributes (Agency theory) or that family firms perform better because the unity of ownership and control reduces agency expenses (Stewardship theory). Our findings support the Stewardship view of the firm. Our findings also demonstrate that CEO-Chairperson duality improves performance but that the combination of family and duality is sub-optimal. We further study implications of institutional investor and insider ownership, compensation structure, and leverage on performance.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1531-6076</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 2332-4244</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Northridge: Western Risk and Insurance Association</publisher><subject>Business structures ; Chief executive officers ; Compensation ; Corporate governance ; Debt ; Economics ; Economists ; Empirical evidence ; Entrepreneurs ; Executive compensation ; Family owned businesses ; Financial leverage ; Guaranty funds ; Hypotheses ; Institutional investments ; Insurance industry ; Insurance providers ; Investors ; Liability insurance ; Nepotism ; Shareholders ; Stockholders ; Strategic management</subject><ispartof>Journal of insurance issues, 2017-04, Vol.40 (1), p.23-60</ispartof><rights>Copyright © Western Risk and Insurance Association, 2017</rights><rights>Copyright Western Risk & Insurance Association Spring 2017</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/44160925$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/44160925$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,799,57992,58225</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Pooser, David M.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Wang, Ping</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Barrese, James</creatorcontrib><title>A Governance Study of Corporate Ownership in the Insurance Industry</title><title>Journal of insurance issues</title><description>This study focuses on family control and ownership patterns in the U.S. insurance industry. Conflicting theories argue that family firms perform worse due to nepotism and weak risk-bearing attributes (Agency theory) or that family firms perform better because the unity of ownership and control reduces agency expenses (Stewardship theory). Our findings support the Stewardship view of the firm. Our findings also demonstrate that CEO-Chairperson duality improves performance but that the combination of family and duality is sub-optimal. We further study implications of institutional investor and insider ownership, compensation structure, and leverage on performance.</description><subject>Business structures</subject><subject>Chief executive officers</subject><subject>Compensation</subject><subject>Corporate governance</subject><subject>Debt</subject><subject>Economics</subject><subject>Economists</subject><subject>Empirical evidence</subject><subject>Entrepreneurs</subject><subject>Executive compensation</subject><subject>Family owned businesses</subject><subject>Financial leverage</subject><subject>Guaranty funds</subject><subject>Hypotheses</subject><subject>Institutional investments</subject><subject>Insurance industry</subject><subject>Insurance providers</subject><subject>Investors</subject><subject>Liability insurance</subject><subject>Nepotism</subject><subject>Shareholders</subject><subject>Stockholders</subject><subject>Strategic management</subject><issn>1531-6076</issn><issn>2332-4244</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2017</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><recordid>eNotzs1KxDAUBeAgCtbRRxACrgtJbn6a5VB0LAzMQl2Xpk2dljGpSar07a2OcOEszsfhXqCMAbCcM84vUUYF0FwSJa_RTYwjIZSBlhkqt3jnv2xwjWstfklzt2Df49KHyYcmWXz4djbE4zDhweF0tLhycQ5_unLdHFNYbtFV35yivfvPDXp7enwtn_P9YVeV233-TqVKOQhijOG614VSneFNDz0YKoSxjaFEro0gHLiybSEVEyvT7e_1AloJBWzQw3l3Cv5ztjHVo5_Xz0-xppoJWWgFalX3ZzXG5EM9heGjCUvNOZVkVfADBY9QMQ</recordid><startdate>20170401</startdate><enddate>20170401</enddate><creator>Pooser, David M.</creator><creator>Wang, Ping</creator><creator>Barrese, James</creator><general>Western Risk and Insurance Association</general><general>Western Risk & Insurance Association</general><scope>0U~</scope><scope>1-H</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>4U-</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7X5</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>88C</scope><scope>8AO</scope><scope>8FI</scope><scope>8FJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>FYUFA</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>GHDGH</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>L.0</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>M0T</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>Q9U</scope><scope>S0X</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20170401</creationdate><title>A Governance Study of Corporate Ownership in the Insurance Industry</title><author>Pooser, David M. ; Wang, Ping ; Barrese, James</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-g167t-350bbb49f9877db4af3f3b155beab10649f504347ec867259879c79c7f53c6383</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2017</creationdate><topic>Business structures</topic><topic>Chief executive officers</topic><topic>Compensation</topic><topic>Corporate governance</topic><topic>Debt</topic><topic>Economics</topic><topic>Economists</topic><topic>Empirical evidence</topic><topic>Entrepreneurs</topic><topic>Executive compensation</topic><topic>Family owned businesses</topic><topic>Financial leverage</topic><topic>Guaranty funds</topic><topic>Hypotheses</topic><topic>Institutional investments</topic><topic>Insurance industry</topic><topic>Insurance providers</topic><topic>Investors</topic><topic>Liability insurance</topic><topic>Nepotism</topic><topic>Shareholders</topic><topic>Stockholders</topic><topic>Strategic management</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Pooser, David M.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Wang, Ping</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Barrese, James</creatorcontrib><collection>Global News & ABI/Inform Professional</collection><collection>Trade PRO</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>University Readers</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (PDF only)</collection><collection>Entrepreneurship Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Healthcare Administration Database (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest Pharma Collection</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Research Library (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>Research Library Prep</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Standard</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global</collection><collection>Healthcare Administration Database</collection><collection>Research Library</collection><collection>Research Library (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><collection>SIRS Editorial</collection><jtitle>Journal of insurance issues</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Pooser, David M.</au><au>Wang, Ping</au><au>Barrese, James</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>A Governance Study of Corporate Ownership in the Insurance Industry</atitle><jtitle>Journal of insurance issues</jtitle><date>2017-04-01</date><risdate>2017</risdate><volume>40</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>23</spage><epage>60</epage><pages>23-60</pages><issn>1531-6076</issn><eissn>2332-4244</eissn><abstract>This study focuses on family control and ownership patterns in the U.S. insurance industry. Conflicting theories argue that family firms perform worse due to nepotism and weak risk-bearing attributes (Agency theory) or that family firms perform better because the unity of ownership and control reduces agency expenses (Stewardship theory). Our findings support the Stewardship view of the firm. Our findings also demonstrate that CEO-Chairperson duality improves performance but that the combination of family and duality is sub-optimal. We further study implications of institutional investor and insider ownership, compensation structure, and leverage on performance.</abstract><cop>Northridge</cop><pub>Western Risk and Insurance Association</pub><tpages>38</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 1531-6076 |
| ispartof | Journal of insurance issues, 2017-04, Vol.40 (1), p.23-60 |
| issn | 1531-6076 2332-4244 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_1925689737 |
| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Business structures Chief executive officers Compensation Corporate governance Debt Economics Economists Empirical evidence Entrepreneurs Executive compensation Family owned businesses Financial leverage Guaranty funds Hypotheses Institutional investments Insurance industry Insurance providers Investors Liability insurance Nepotism Shareholders Stockholders Strategic management |
| title | A Governance Study of Corporate Ownership in the Insurance Industry |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-02-06T17%3A19%3A32IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=A%20Governance%20Study%20of%20Corporate%20Ownership%20in%20the%20Insurance%20Industry&rft.jtitle=Journal%20of%20insurance%20issues&rft.au=Pooser,%20David%20M.&rft.date=2017-04-01&rft.volume=40&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=23&rft.epage=60&rft.pages=23-60&rft.issn=1531-6076&rft.eissn=2332-4244&rft_id=info:doi/&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E44160925%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1925689737&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=44160925&rfr_iscdi=true |