Opportunity and Overrides: The Effect of Institutional Public Support on Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Decisions
Existing theories of legislative-judicial relations emphasize the role of public support for the judiciary on the likelihood of legislative compliance. Although Congress can strengthen or weaken the Supreme Court's decisions after initial compliance, the role of public support for the judiciary...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Political research quarterly 2017-09, Vol.70 (3), p.632-643 |
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| container_title | Political research quarterly |
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| creator | Nelson, Michael J. Uribe-McGuire, Alicia |
| description | Existing theories of legislative-judicial relations emphasize the role of public support for the judiciary on the likelihood of legislative compliance. Although Congress can strengthen or weaken the Supreme Court's decisions after initial compliance, the role of public support for the judiciary on subsequent legislative action is unclear. We develop a theory of legislative-judicial interactions, which suggests that Congress considers the court's current level of public support when determining whether to override a Supreme Court decision. We test our theory using data on congressional overrides of US Supreme Court decisions, finding that high levels of public support for the court shield the court from hostile congressional action. The results underscore the vital role played by the public in interbranch relations, suggesting that public support plays a role in the legacy of a judicial decision beyond ensuring initial compliance. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1177/1065912917709353 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 1065-9129 |
| ispartof | Political research quarterly, 2017-09, Vol.70 (3), p.632-643 |
| issn | 1065-9129 1938-274X |
| language | eng |
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| source | Access via SAGE; PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; Alma/SFX Local Collection |
| subjects | Compliance Congressional investigations Constitutional review Court decisions Evidence Federal court decisions Judicial reviews Judiciary Legislatures Political science Politics Public opinion Research centers State court decisions Supreme Court decisions Supreme courts |
| title | Opportunity and Overrides: The Effect of Institutional Public Support on Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Decisions |
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