Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences

Much of the theoretical literature on voting with private information finds that voters do not vote sincerely at the equilibrium. Yet there is little empirical support for this result. This paper shows that when the electorate is sufficiently divided, sincere voting is an equilibrium strategy for an...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Economics letters 2017-05, Vol.154, p.120-123
1. Verfasser:	Ginzburg, Boris
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Conflicting preferences Economic models Equilibrium Fractionalisation Information Strategic voting Voter behavior Voters Voting
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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