Bullshit as a Problem of Social Epistemology
Bullshit is a widely recognized problem. While philosophy has given the topic some consideration, the analysis it offers is limited by an individualistic understanding of knowledge and epistemology. This article reframes bullshit as a problem of social epistemology, drawing on philosophical work on...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Sociological theory 2017-03, Vol.35 (1), p.15-38 |
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| container_title | Sociological theory |
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| creator | Wakeham, Joshua |
| description | Bullshit is a widely recognized problem. While philosophy has given the topic some consideration, the analysis it offers is limited by an individualistic understanding of knowledge and epistemology. This article reframes bullshit as a problem of social epistemology, drawing on philosophical work on social epistemology as well as related research in psychology and the sociology of knowledge to explore the problem of epistemic vigilance. The article then draws on interactional sociology as well as Glaeser's recent work on understanding and institutions to delineate those social forces that undermine the task of epistemic vigilance. The article then examines several different types of bullshit in light of this tension between the individual pragmatic need to have true beliefs and the social pragmatic need to get along. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1177/0735275117692835 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0735-2751 |
| ispartof | Sociological theory, 2017-03, Vol.35 (1), p.15-38 |
| issn | 0735-2751 1467-9558 |
| language | eng |
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| source | SAGE Complete A-Z List; Jstor Complete Legacy; Sociological Abstracts |
| subjects | Cognition Epistemology Judgment Normativity Pragmatism Psychology Social epistemology Social forces Social interaction Social life Social philosophy Social theories Sociology Sociology of knowledge Truth Vigilance |
| title | Bullshit as a Problem of Social Epistemology |
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