Competitiveness and Subsidy or Tax Policy for New Technology Adoption in Duopoly
We consider a problem of subsidy or tax policy for new technology adoption by duopolistic firms. The technology is developed in and transferred by a foreign country to the domestic country. It is free but each firm must expend some fixed set-up cost for education of its staff to adopt and use it. As...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Global economic review 2017, 46(1), , pp.18-32 |
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| container_title | Global economic review |
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| creator | Hattori, Masahiko Tanaka, Yasuhito |
| description | We consider a problem of subsidy or tax policy for new technology adoption by duopolistic firms. The technology is developed in and transferred by a foreign country to the domestic country. It is free but each firm must expend some fixed set-up cost for education of its staff to adopt and use it. Assuming that each firm maximizes the weighted average of absolute and relative profits, we examine the relationship between competitiveness and subsidy or tax policies for technology adoption, and show that when firm behavior is not competitive (the weight on the relative profit is small), the optimal policy of the government may be taxation; when firm behavior is competitive (the weight on the relative profit is large), the optimal policy is subsidization or inaction and not taxation. However, if firm behavior is extremely competitive (close to perfect competition), taxation case re-emerges. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1080/1226508X.2016.1256787 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Global Economic Review, 2017, 46(1), , pp.18-32 |
| issn | 1226-508X 1744-3873 |
| language | eng |
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| source | PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Adoption of innovations Competition Duopoly New technology adoption Profits Subsidies subsidy tax Taxation 경제학 |
| title | Competitiveness and Subsidy or Tax Policy for New Technology Adoption in Duopoly |
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