The problem of logical omniscience, the preface paradox, and doxastic commitments
The main goal of this paper is to investigate what explanatory resources Robert Brandom's distinction between acknowledged and consequential commitments affords in relation to the problem of logical omniscience. With this distinction the importance of the doxastic perspective under consideratio...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Synthese (Dordrecht) 2017-03, Vol.194 (3), p.917-939 |
|---|---|
| 1. Verfasser: | |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 939 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 3 |
| container_start_page | 917 |
| container_title | Synthese (Dordrecht) |
| container_volume | 194 |
| creator | Skovgaard-Olsen, Niels |
| description | The main goal of this paper is to investigate what explanatory resources Robert Brandom's distinction between acknowledged and consequential commitments affords in relation to the problem of logical omniscience. With this distinction the importance of the doxastic perspective under consideration for the relationship between logic and norms of reasoning is emphasized, and it becomes possible to handle a number of problematic cases discussed in the literature without thereby incurring a commitment to revisionism about logic. One such case in particular is the preface paradox, which will receive an extensive treatment. As we shall see, the problem of logical omniscience not only arises within theories based on deductive logic; but also within the recent paradigm shift in psychology of reasoning. So dealing with this problem is important not only for philosophical purposes but also from a psychological perspective. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11229-015-0979-7 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_1874638522</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>26166295</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>26166295</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c389t-2c2d2aaa02a96f9ffcca0f3b9cf7c7257ca885487900dbb39e7037bc3e5557b13</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9kMtKxDAUhoMoOF4ewF1A3E31JGmaZimDNxgQYVyHNE3GDm0zJhnQtzdjXczK1bnwf-fyI3RF4JYAiLtICKWyAMILkEIW4gjNCBcsV1V5jGYALDdrLk7RWYwbAEKqEmbobfVh8Tb4prcD9g73ft0Z3WM_jF00nR2NneP0q7FOmxx10K3_mmM9tjgnOqbOYOOHoUuDHVO8QCdO99Fe_sVz9P74sFo8F8vXp5fF_bIwrJapoIa2VGsNVMvKSeeM0eBYI40TRlAujK5rXtZCArRNw6QVwERjmOWci4awc3Q9zc3Xf-5sTGrjd2HMKxWpRVmxmlOaVWRSmeBjzD-obegGHb4VAbV3Tk3Oqeyc2junRGboxMSsHdc2HEz-B7qZoE1MPhxuoSwDtCJVRSVnP2SkfME</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1874638522</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>The problem of logical omniscience, the preface paradox, and doxastic commitments</title><source>JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing</source><source>SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings</source><creator>Skovgaard-Olsen, Niels</creator><creatorcontrib>Skovgaard-Olsen, Niels</creatorcontrib><description>The main goal of this paper is to investigate what explanatory resources Robert Brandom's distinction between acknowledged and consequential commitments affords in relation to the problem of logical omniscience. With this distinction the importance of the doxastic perspective under consideration for the relationship between logic and norms of reasoning is emphasized, and it becomes possible to handle a number of problematic cases discussed in the literature without thereby incurring a commitment to revisionism about logic. One such case in particular is the preface paradox, which will receive an extensive treatment. As we shall see, the problem of logical omniscience not only arises within theories based on deductive logic; but also within the recent paradigm shift in psychology of reasoning. So dealing with this problem is important not only for philosophical purposes but also from a psychological perspective.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0039-7857</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1573-0964</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0979-7</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Dordrecht: Springer</publisher><subject>Education ; Epistemology ; Logic ; Metaphysics ; ORIGINAL RESEARCH ; Philosophy ; Philosophy of Language ; Philosophy of Science ; Psychology ; Reasoning ; Revisionism</subject><ispartof>Synthese (Dordrecht), 2017-03, Vol.194 (3), p.917-939</ispartof><rights>Springer Science+Business Media 2017</rights><rights>Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015</rights><rights>Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2017.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c389t-2c2d2aaa02a96f9ffcca0f3b9cf7c7257ca885487900dbb39e7037bc3e5557b13</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c389t-2c2d2aaa02a96f9ffcca0f3b9cf7c7257ca885487900dbb39e7037bc3e5557b13</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26166295$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/26166295$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,803,27924,27925,41488,42557,51319,58017,58250</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Skovgaard-Olsen, Niels</creatorcontrib><title>The problem of logical omniscience, the preface paradox, and doxastic commitments</title><title>Synthese (Dordrecht)</title><addtitle>Synthese</addtitle><description>The main goal of this paper is to investigate what explanatory resources Robert Brandom's distinction between acknowledged and consequential commitments affords in relation to the problem of logical omniscience. With this distinction the importance of the doxastic perspective under consideration for the relationship between logic and norms of reasoning is emphasized, and it becomes possible to handle a number of problematic cases discussed in the literature without thereby incurring a commitment to revisionism about logic. One such case in particular is the preface paradox, which will receive an extensive treatment. As we shall see, the problem of logical omniscience not only arises within theories based on deductive logic; but also within the recent paradigm shift in psychology of reasoning. So dealing with this problem is important not only for philosophical purposes but also from a psychological perspective.</description><subject>Education</subject><subject>Epistemology</subject><subject>Logic</subject><subject>Metaphysics</subject><subject>ORIGINAL RESEARCH</subject><subject>Philosophy</subject><subject>Philosophy of Language</subject><subject>Philosophy of Science</subject><subject>Psychology</subject><subject>Reasoning</subject><subject>Revisionism</subject><issn>0039-7857</issn><issn>1573-0964</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2017</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AIMQZ</sourceid><sourceid>AVQMV</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>K50</sourceid><sourceid>M1D</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kMtKxDAUhoMoOF4ewF1A3E31JGmaZimDNxgQYVyHNE3GDm0zJhnQtzdjXczK1bnwf-fyI3RF4JYAiLtICKWyAMILkEIW4gjNCBcsV1V5jGYALDdrLk7RWYwbAEKqEmbobfVh8Tb4prcD9g73ft0Z3WM_jF00nR2NneP0q7FOmxx10K3_mmM9tjgnOqbOYOOHoUuDHVO8QCdO99Fe_sVz9P74sFo8F8vXp5fF_bIwrJapoIa2VGsNVMvKSeeM0eBYI40TRlAujK5rXtZCArRNw6QVwERjmOWci4awc3Q9zc3Xf-5sTGrjd2HMKxWpRVmxmlOaVWRSmeBjzD-obegGHb4VAbV3Tk3Oqeyc2junRGboxMSsHdc2HEz-B7qZoE1MPhxuoSwDtCJVRSVnP2SkfME</recordid><startdate>20170301</startdate><enddate>20170301</enddate><creator>Skovgaard-Olsen, Niels</creator><general>Springer</general><general>Springer Netherlands</general><general>Springer Nature B.V</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>AABKS</scope><scope>ABSDQ</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>AIMQZ</scope><scope>AVQMV</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>GB0</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>K50</scope><scope>LIQON</scope><scope>M1D</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>Q9U</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20170301</creationdate><title>The problem of logical omniscience, the preface paradox, and doxastic commitments</title><author>Skovgaard-Olsen, Niels</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c389t-2c2d2aaa02a96f9ffcca0f3b9cf7c7257ca885487900dbb39e7037bc3e5557b13</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2017</creationdate><topic>Education</topic><topic>Epistemology</topic><topic>Logic</topic><topic>Metaphysics</topic><topic>ORIGINAL RESEARCH</topic><topic>Philosophy</topic><topic>Philosophy of Language</topic><topic>Philosophy of Science</topic><topic>Psychology</topic><topic>Reasoning</topic><topic>Revisionism</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Skovgaard-Olsen, Niels</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>Research Library (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Philosophy Collection</collection><collection>Philosophy Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>ProQuest One Literature</collection><collection>Arts Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>DELNET Social Sciences & Humanities Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>Research Library Prep</collection><collection>Art, Design & Architecture Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Literature - U.S. Customers Only</collection><collection>Arts & Humanities Database</collection><collection>Research Library</collection><collection>Research Library (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central China</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><jtitle>Synthese (Dordrecht)</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Skovgaard-Olsen, Niels</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>The problem of logical omniscience, the preface paradox, and doxastic commitments</atitle><jtitle>Synthese (Dordrecht)</jtitle><stitle>Synthese</stitle><date>2017-03-01</date><risdate>2017</risdate><volume>194</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>917</spage><epage>939</epage><pages>917-939</pages><issn>0039-7857</issn><eissn>1573-0964</eissn><abstract>The main goal of this paper is to investigate what explanatory resources Robert Brandom's distinction between acknowledged and consequential commitments affords in relation to the problem of logical omniscience. With this distinction the importance of the doxastic perspective under consideration for the relationship between logic and norms of reasoning is emphasized, and it becomes possible to handle a number of problematic cases discussed in the literature without thereby incurring a commitment to revisionism about logic. One such case in particular is the preface paradox, which will receive an extensive treatment. As we shall see, the problem of logical omniscience not only arises within theories based on deductive logic; but also within the recent paradigm shift in psychology of reasoning. So dealing with this problem is important not only for philosophical purposes but also from a psychological perspective.</abstract><cop>Dordrecht</cop><pub>Springer</pub><doi>10.1007/s11229-015-0979-7</doi><tpages>23</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0039-7857 |
| ispartof | Synthese (Dordrecht), 2017-03, Vol.194 (3), p.917-939 |
| issn | 0039-7857 1573-0964 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_1874638522 |
| source | JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings |
| subjects | Education Epistemology Logic Metaphysics ORIGINAL RESEARCH Philosophy Philosophy of Language Philosophy of Science Psychology Reasoning Revisionism |
| title | The problem of logical omniscience, the preface paradox, and doxastic commitments |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-26T04%3A56%3A57IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=The%20problem%20of%20logical%20omniscience,%20the%20preface%20paradox,%20and%20doxastic%20commitments&rft.jtitle=Synthese%20(Dordrecht)&rft.au=Skovgaard-Olsen,%20Niels&rft.date=2017-03-01&rft.volume=194&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=917&rft.epage=939&rft.pages=917-939&rft.issn=0039-7857&rft.eissn=1573-0964&rft_id=info:doi/10.1007/s11229-015-0979-7&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E26166295%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1874638522&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=26166295&rfr_iscdi=true |