Administrative actavis
The cost of prescription drugs, a function of the nexus of patent law and antitrust law, has recently been thrust into the spotlight. In the shadow of the Federal Trade Commission's vigorous challenges to anticompetitive agreements between branded manufacturers and their potential generic compe...
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Veröffentlicht in: | New York University law review (1950) 2016-12, Vol.91 (6), p.1760-1793 |
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description | The cost of prescription drugs, a function of the nexus of patent law and antitrust law, has recently been thrust into the spotlight. In the shadow of the Federal Trade Commission's vigorous challenges to anticompetitive agreements between branded manufacturers and their potential generic competitors, a new player entered the administrative patent invalidity arena-noncompetitors, such as hedge fund managers, who, despite their reputation for seeking profit at all costs, asserted a seemingly puzzling altruistic interest in invalidating certain patents that prevent generic competitors from entering the market. In light of "abuse of process" accusations and calls for sanctions, this Note suggests that corporate law may facilitate an understanding of the role of noncompetitors in patent invalidation. Using the corporate law phenomenon of greenmail as an analogy, this Note argues that noncompetitors may actually facilitate competition and, as such, should be permitted to continue filing administrative patent challenges. |
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In the shadow of the Federal Trade Commission's vigorous challenges to anticompetitive agreements between branded manufacturers and their potential generic competitors, a new player entered the administrative patent invalidity arena-noncompetitors, such as hedge fund managers, who, despite their reputation for seeking profit at all costs, asserted a seemingly puzzling altruistic interest in invalidating certain patents that prevent generic competitors from entering the market. In light of "abuse of process" accusations and calls for sanctions, this Note suggests that corporate law may facilitate an understanding of the role of noncompetitors in patent invalidation. Using the corporate law phenomenon of greenmail as an analogy, this Note argues that noncompetitors may actually facilitate competition and, as such, should be permitted to continue filing administrative patent challenges.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0028-7881</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>New York City, NY: New York University School of Law</publisher><subject>ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ; Antitrust law ; Antitrust laws ; Commercial treaties ; Competition ; COMPETITION LAW ; Corporation law ; CORPORATIONS LAW ; Generic drugs ; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ; Noncompetition agreements ; Patent law ; Patent laws and legislation ; Pharmaceutical industry ; Prescription drugs ; TRADE PRACTICES ; U.S. states ; United States. Federal Trade Commission</subject><ispartof>New York University law review (1950), 2016-12, Vol.91 (6), p.1760-1793</ispartof><rights>Copyright New York University Law Publications Dec 2016</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,780,784</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Smith, Monica L</creatorcontrib><title>Administrative actavis</title><title>New York University law review (1950)</title><description>The cost of prescription drugs, a function of the nexus of patent law and antitrust law, has recently been thrust into the spotlight. In the shadow of the Federal Trade Commission's vigorous challenges to anticompetitive agreements between branded manufacturers and their potential generic competitors, a new player entered the administrative patent invalidity arena-noncompetitors, such as hedge fund managers, who, despite their reputation for seeking profit at all costs, asserted a seemingly puzzling altruistic interest in invalidating certain patents that prevent generic competitors from entering the market. In light of "abuse of process" accusations and calls for sanctions, this Note suggests that corporate law may facilitate an understanding of the role of noncompetitors in patent invalidation. Using the corporate law phenomenon of greenmail as an analogy, this Note argues that noncompetitors may actually facilitate competition and, as such, should be permitted to continue filing administrative patent challenges.</description><subject>ADMINISTRATIVE LAW</subject><subject>Antitrust law</subject><subject>Antitrust laws</subject><subject>Commercial treaties</subject><subject>Competition</subject><subject>COMPETITION LAW</subject><subject>Corporation law</subject><subject>CORPORATIONS LAW</subject><subject>Generic drugs</subject><subject>INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY</subject><subject>Noncompetition agreements</subject><subject>Patent law</subject><subject>Patent laws and legislation</subject><subject>Pharmaceutical industry</subject><subject>Prescription drugs</subject><subject>TRADE PRACTICES</subject><subject>U.S. states</subject><subject>United States. Federal Trade Commission</subject><issn>0028-7881</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2016</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid/><recordid>eNqVzT9PwzAQhnEPIFEKKzMSc6S7nOM_Y1UBRYrUBWbLcezWFU2C7fbzUyhMTEw3vI9-d8FmALWqpFJ4xa5z3gEAF1rO2N2i38ch5pJsiUd_b12xx5hv2GWw79nf_tw5e3t6fF2uqnb9_LJctNVEKEslnZYelOscaeE7LSm4gJ3wJHng6IkEt0IEp7CrG49WoJJ11wsi2-hG0Jw9nN0pjR8Hn4vZjYc0nF4aVEI3AAjqVLXnKu1jMXYT81TMtpQpm94Wa-IQxu9pTBvTj9EgGCIUv2kNqBGQAypef3Grv1z2Nrntf6lP_CZn0A</recordid><startdate>20161201</startdate><enddate>20161201</enddate><creator>Smith, Monica L</creator><general>New York University School of Law</general><general>New York University Law Publications</general><scope/></search><sort><creationdate>20161201</creationdate><title>Administrative actavis</title><author>Smith, Monica L</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-p317t-7c97e08cbc396eb973fcf1b6e374f41e3364a66fc81b25e1a61872bd633a59563</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2016</creationdate><topic>ADMINISTRATIVE LAW</topic><topic>Antitrust law</topic><topic>Antitrust laws</topic><topic>Commercial treaties</topic><topic>Competition</topic><topic>COMPETITION LAW</topic><topic>Corporation law</topic><topic>CORPORATIONS LAW</topic><topic>Generic drugs</topic><topic>INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY</topic><topic>Noncompetition agreements</topic><topic>Patent law</topic><topic>Patent laws and legislation</topic><topic>Pharmaceutical industry</topic><topic>Prescription drugs</topic><topic>TRADE PRACTICES</topic><topic>U.S. states</topic><topic>United States. Federal Trade Commission</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Smith, Monica L</creatorcontrib><jtitle>New York University law review (1950)</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Smith, Monica L</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Administrative actavis</atitle><jtitle>New York University law review (1950)</jtitle><date>2016-12-01</date><risdate>2016</risdate><volume>91</volume><issue>6</issue><spage>1760</spage><epage>1793</epage><pages>1760-1793</pages><issn>0028-7881</issn><abstract>The cost of prescription drugs, a function of the nexus of patent law and antitrust law, has recently been thrust into the spotlight. In the shadow of the Federal Trade Commission's vigorous challenges to anticompetitive agreements between branded manufacturers and their potential generic competitors, a new player entered the administrative patent invalidity arena-noncompetitors, such as hedge fund managers, who, despite their reputation for seeking profit at all costs, asserted a seemingly puzzling altruistic interest in invalidating certain patents that prevent generic competitors from entering the market. In light of "abuse of process" accusations and calls for sanctions, this Note suggests that corporate law may facilitate an understanding of the role of noncompetitors in patent invalidation. Using the corporate law phenomenon of greenmail as an analogy, this Note argues that noncompetitors may actually facilitate competition and, as such, should be permitted to continue filing administrative patent challenges.</abstract><cop>New York City, NY</cop><pub>New York University School of Law</pub><tpages>34</tpages></addata></record> |
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subjects | ADMINISTRATIVE LAW Antitrust law Antitrust laws Commercial treaties Competition COMPETITION LAW Corporation law CORPORATIONS LAW Generic drugs INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Noncompetition agreements Patent law Patent laws and legislation Pharmaceutical industry Prescription drugs TRADE PRACTICES U.S. states United States. Federal Trade Commission |
title | Administrative actavis |
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