Competitive Package Size Decisions
[Display omitted] •Package-size decisions depend on demand, cost, and competition.•Package downsizing mitigates the effects of price increase.•Package size and price are strategic complements.•Package downsizing intensifies price competition.•Ability to raise unit prices via package downsizing is co...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of retailing 2016-12, Vol.92 (4), p.445-469 |
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creator | Yonezawa, Koichi Richards, Timothy J. |
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•Package-size decisions depend on demand, cost, and competition.•Package downsizing mitigates the effects of price increase.•Package size and price are strategic complements.•Package downsizing intensifies price competition.•Ability to raise unit prices via package downsizing is constrained by competition.
In the consumer packaged goods (CPGs) industry, consumers base their purchase decisions in part on package size because different package sizes offer different levels of convenience. The heterogeneous preference for package size allows manufacturers to use package size as a competitive tool in order to raise margins in the face of higher production costs. By competing in package sizes, manufacturers may be able to soften the degree of price competition in the downstream market, and raise margins accordingly. In order to test this hypothesis, we develop a structural model of consumer demand, and manufacturers’ joint decisions regarding package size and price applied to supermarket chain-level scanner data for the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal category. While others have argued that manufacturers reduce package sizes as a means of raising unit prices in a hidden way, we show that package size and price are strategic complements – downsizing intensifies price competition, which does not allow manufacturers to raise unit prices through package downsizing. Therefore, package downsizing does not yield a desirable outcome for manufactures. On the other hand, retailers benefit from package downsizing, as it leads to lower wholesale prices, and higher category profits. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.jretai.2016.06.001 |
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•Package-size decisions depend on demand, cost, and competition.•Package downsizing mitigates the effects of price increase.•Package size and price are strategic complements.•Package downsizing intensifies price competition.•Ability to raise unit prices via package downsizing is constrained by competition.
In the consumer packaged goods (CPGs) industry, consumers base their purchase decisions in part on package size because different package sizes offer different levels of convenience. The heterogeneous preference for package size allows manufacturers to use package size as a competitive tool in order to raise margins in the face of higher production costs. By competing in package sizes, manufacturers may be able to soften the degree of price competition in the downstream market, and raise margins accordingly. In order to test this hypothesis, we develop a structural model of consumer demand, and manufacturers’ joint decisions regarding package size and price applied to supermarket chain-level scanner data for the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal category. While others have argued that manufacturers reduce package sizes as a means of raising unit prices in a hidden way, we show that package size and price are strategic complements – downsizing intensifies price competition, which does not allow manufacturers to raise unit prices through package downsizing. Therefore, package downsizing does not yield a desirable outcome for manufactures. On the other hand, retailers benefit from package downsizing, as it leads to lower wholesale prices, and higher category profits.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0022-4359</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1873-3271</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.jretai.2016.06.001</identifier><identifier>CODEN: JLREA3</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Greenwich: Elsevier Inc</publisher><subject>Breakfast foods ; Cereals ; Competition ; Consumers ; Consumption ; Costs ; Differentiated products ; Discrete choice ; Hypotheses ; Manufacturers ; Marketing ; Natural gas prices ; Package size ; Packaged goods ; Prices ; Pricing ; Product design ; Retail stores ; Science ; Variables</subject><ispartof>Journal of retailing, 2016-12, Vol.92 (4), p.445-469</ispartof><rights>2016 New York University</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c411t-39e7c275d601d7aee2ec8c799aa4bb4c1498fb2558463781b218f49d78c23ab63</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c411t-39e7c275d601d7aee2ec8c799aa4bb4c1498fb2558463781b218f49d78c23ab63</cites><orcidid>0000-0003-1532-262X</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.proquest.com/docview/1858117927?pq-origsite=primo$$EHTML$$P50$$Gproquest$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,778,782,3539,27907,27908,45978,64366,64370,72220</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Yonezawa, Koichi</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Richards, Timothy J.</creatorcontrib><title>Competitive Package Size Decisions</title><title>Journal of retailing</title><description>[Display omitted]
•Package-size decisions depend on demand, cost, and competition.•Package downsizing mitigates the effects of price increase.•Package size and price are strategic complements.•Package downsizing intensifies price competition.•Ability to raise unit prices via package downsizing is constrained by competition.
In the consumer packaged goods (CPGs) industry, consumers base their purchase decisions in part on package size because different package sizes offer different levels of convenience. The heterogeneous preference for package size allows manufacturers to use package size as a competitive tool in order to raise margins in the face of higher production costs. By competing in package sizes, manufacturers may be able to soften the degree of price competition in the downstream market, and raise margins accordingly. In order to test this hypothesis, we develop a structural model of consumer demand, and manufacturers’ joint decisions regarding package size and price applied to supermarket chain-level scanner data for the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal category. While others have argued that manufacturers reduce package sizes as a means of raising unit prices in a hidden way, we show that package size and price are strategic complements – downsizing intensifies price competition, which does not allow manufacturers to raise unit prices through package downsizing. Therefore, package downsizing does not yield a desirable outcome for manufactures. On the other hand, retailers benefit from package downsizing, as it leads to lower wholesale prices, and higher category profits.</description><subject>Breakfast foods</subject><subject>Cereals</subject><subject>Competition</subject><subject>Consumers</subject><subject>Consumption</subject><subject>Costs</subject><subject>Differentiated products</subject><subject>Discrete choice</subject><subject>Hypotheses</subject><subject>Manufacturers</subject><subject>Marketing</subject><subject>Natural gas prices</subject><subject>Package size</subject><subject>Packaged goods</subject><subject>Prices</subject><subject>Pricing</subject><subject>Product design</subject><subject>Retail stores</subject><subject>Science</subject><subject>Variables</subject><issn>0022-4359</issn><issn>1873-3271</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2016</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><recordid>eNp9UE1LxDAUDKJgXf0HHhY9t-YlaZNcBFnXD1hQUM8hTV8l1W3XpLugv94s9SwMPAZm5jFDyDnQAihUV13RBRytL1hiBU2gcEAyUJLnnEk4JBmljOWCl_qYnMTY0cSFohm5WAzrDY5-9DucP1v3Yd9x_uJ_cH6Lzkc_9PGUHLX2M-LZ352Rt7vl6-IhXz3dPy5uVrkTAGPONUrHZNlUFBppERk65aTW1oq6Fg6EVm3NylKJiksFNQPVCt1I5Ri3dcVn5HLK3YTha4txNN2wDX16aUCVCkBqJpNKTCoXhhgDtmYT_NqGbwPU7NcwnZnWMPs1DE2gkGzXkw1Tg53HYKLz2DtsfEA3mmbw_wf8AtbRaB4</recordid><startdate>20161201</startdate><enddate>20161201</enddate><creator>Yonezawa, Koichi</creator><creator>Richards, Timothy J.</creator><general>Elsevier Inc</general><general>Elsevier Limited</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7RQ</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7X5</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>88G</scope><scope>8FI</scope><scope>8FJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>EHMNL</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>FYUFA</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>GHDGH</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>M2M</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>PSYQQ</scope><scope>Q9U</scope><scope>U9A</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1532-262X</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20161201</creationdate><title>Competitive Package Size Decisions</title><author>Yonezawa, Koichi ; 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•Package-size decisions depend on demand, cost, and competition.•Package downsizing mitigates the effects of price increase.•Package size and price are strategic complements.•Package downsizing intensifies price competition.•Ability to raise unit prices via package downsizing is constrained by competition.
In the consumer packaged goods (CPGs) industry, consumers base their purchase decisions in part on package size because different package sizes offer different levels of convenience. The heterogeneous preference for package size allows manufacturers to use package size as a competitive tool in order to raise margins in the face of higher production costs. By competing in package sizes, manufacturers may be able to soften the degree of price competition in the downstream market, and raise margins accordingly. In order to test this hypothesis, we develop a structural model of consumer demand, and manufacturers’ joint decisions regarding package size and price applied to supermarket chain-level scanner data for the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal category. While others have argued that manufacturers reduce package sizes as a means of raising unit prices in a hidden way, we show that package size and price are strategic complements – downsizing intensifies price competition, which does not allow manufacturers to raise unit prices through package downsizing. Therefore, package downsizing does not yield a desirable outcome for manufactures. On the other hand, retailers benefit from package downsizing, as it leads to lower wholesale prices, and higher category profits.</abstract><cop>Greenwich</cop><pub>Elsevier Inc</pub><doi>10.1016/j.jretai.2016.06.001</doi><tpages>25</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1532-262X</orcidid><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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subjects | Breakfast foods Cereals Competition Consumers Consumption Costs Differentiated products Discrete choice Hypotheses Manufacturers Marketing Natural gas prices Package size Packaged goods Prices Pricing Product design Retail stores Science Variables |
title | Competitive Package Size Decisions |
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