Difference-Form Persuasion Contests

We explore the equilibrium properties of two types of “difference‐form” persuasion contest functions derived in Skaperdas and Vaidya in which contestants spend resources to persuade an audience. We find that both types of functions generate interior pure strategy Nash equilibria unlike Baik and Che...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of public economic theory 2016-12, Vol.18 (6), p.882-909
Hauptverfasser:	SKAPERDAS, STERGIOS, TOUKAN, AMJAD, VAIDYA, SAMARTH
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Economic theory Equilibrium Expenditures Game theory Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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