Services outsourcing under asymmetric cost information
•We analyze a service supply chain where client firm sources from a set of vendors.•Vendor’s variable cost structure is private information.•We find as cost variation increases, optimum number of vendors decreases.•We find a threshold policy of impact of demand uncertainty on size of vendor base. In...
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Veröffentlicht in: | European journal of operational research 2017-03, Vol.257 (2), p.456-467 |
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container_title | European journal of operational research |
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creator | Mahadevan, B. Hazra, Jishnu Jain, Tarun |
description | •We analyze a service supply chain where client firm sources from a set of vendors.•Vendor’s variable cost structure is private information.•We find as cost variation increases, optimum number of vendors decreases.•We find a threshold policy of impact of demand uncertainty on size of vendor base.
In this paper, we investigate the impact of cost heterogeneity on the optimal sourcing strategy of a client firm that outsources her service requirements to a set of outside vendors/service providers. We analyze a typical situation involving service providers, who differ from one another with respect to the marginal cost and characterize the firm’s optimal size of vendor network. In our model, the client firm does not have complete information about the vendors’ cost structure.
From the client firm’s perspective, for the case when the open market demand distribution is Uniform and the buyer’s demand is Normally distributed, we analytically derive the capacity to be procured as well as and the optimal number of vendors to be awarded the contract. Our analysis reveals that with an increase in vendor base cost heterogeneity, the optimum number of required vendors decreases. We further conclude that when the mean demand of the client firm is below a threshold value, then as the client firm’s demand variability increases, the optimal number of vendors increases. Whereas, in case the client firm’s mean demand is above the threshold value, then the optimal size of vendor base decreases as the client firm’s demand variability increases. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.ejor.2016.07.020 |
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In this paper, we investigate the impact of cost heterogeneity on the optimal sourcing strategy of a client firm that outsources her service requirements to a set of outside vendors/service providers. We analyze a typical situation involving service providers, who differ from one another with respect to the marginal cost and characterize the firm’s optimal size of vendor network. In our model, the client firm does not have complete information about the vendors’ cost structure.
From the client firm’s perspective, for the case when the open market demand distribution is Uniform and the buyer’s demand is Normally distributed, we analytically derive the capacity to be procured as well as and the optimal number of vendors to be awarded the contract. Our analysis reveals that with an increase in vendor base cost heterogeneity, the optimum number of required vendors decreases. We further conclude that when the mean demand of the client firm is below a threshold value, then as the client firm’s demand variability increases, the optimal number of vendors increases. Whereas, in case the client firm’s mean demand is above the threshold value, then the optimal size of vendor base decreases as the client firm’s demand variability increases.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0377-2217</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1872-6860</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2016.07.020</identifier><identifier>CODEN: EJORDT</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V</publisher><subject>Asymmetric cost information ; Bidding ; Capacity reservation ; Decision processes ; Demand ; Impact analysis ; Marginal costs ; Outsourcing ; Studies</subject><ispartof>European journal of operational research, 2017-03, Vol.257 (2), p.456-467</ispartof><rights>2016 Elsevier B.V.</rights><rights>Copyright Elsevier Sequoia S.A. Mar 1, 2017</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c371t-f6571998abc303b7ddddfa87819b73f555825caaa08cd728edaabf5b0714042c3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c371t-f6571998abc303b7ddddfa87819b73f555825caaa08cd728edaabf5b0714042c3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.07.020$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,777,781,3537,27905,27906,45976</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Mahadevan, B.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Hazra, Jishnu</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Jain, Tarun</creatorcontrib><title>Services outsourcing under asymmetric cost information</title><title>European journal of operational research</title><description>•We analyze a service supply chain where client firm sources from a set of vendors.•Vendor’s variable cost structure is private information.•We find as cost variation increases, optimum number of vendors decreases.•We find a threshold policy of impact of demand uncertainty on size of vendor base.
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From the client firm’s perspective, for the case when the open market demand distribution is Uniform and the buyer’s demand is Normally distributed, we analytically derive the capacity to be procured as well as and the optimal number of vendors to be awarded the contract. Our analysis reveals that with an increase in vendor base cost heterogeneity, the optimum number of required vendors decreases. We further conclude that when the mean demand of the client firm is below a threshold value, then as the client firm’s demand variability increases, the optimal number of vendors increases. Whereas, in case the client firm’s mean demand is above the threshold value, then the optimal size of vendor base decreases as the client firm’s demand variability increases.</description><subject>Asymmetric cost information</subject><subject>Bidding</subject><subject>Capacity reservation</subject><subject>Decision processes</subject><subject>Demand</subject><subject>Impact analysis</subject><subject>Marginal costs</subject><subject>Outsourcing</subject><subject>Studies</subject><issn>0377-2217</issn><issn>1872-6860</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2017</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp9kEFLxDAQhYMouK7-AU8Fz60zyaZJwYssugoLHtRzSNNEUmyzJu3C_nuzrGfn8ubw3szjI-QWoULA-r6vbB9iRfNegaiAwhlZoBS0rGUN52QBTIiSUhSX5CqlHgCQI1-Q-t3GvTc2FWGeUpij8eNXMY-djYVOh2GwU_SmMCFNhR9diIOefBivyYXT38ne_OmSfD4_faxfyu3b5nX9uC0NEziVruYCm0bq1jBgrejyOC2FxKYVzHHOJeVGaw3SdIJK22ndOt6CwBWsqGFLcne6u4vhZ7ZpUn3uOOaXCuWKskYwpNlFTy4TQ0rROrWLftDxoBDUkY_q1ZGPOvJRIFTmk0MPp5DN_ffeRpWMt6OxnY_WTKoL_r_4L6ZvbwI</recordid><startdate>20170301</startdate><enddate>20170301</enddate><creator>Mahadevan, B.</creator><creator>Hazra, Jishnu</creator><creator>Jain, Tarun</creator><general>Elsevier B.V</general><general>Elsevier Sequoia S.A</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7SC</scope><scope>7TB</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>FR3</scope><scope>JQ2</scope><scope>L7M</scope><scope>L~C</scope><scope>L~D</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20170301</creationdate><title>Services outsourcing under asymmetric cost information</title><author>Mahadevan, B. ; Hazra, Jishnu ; Jain, Tarun</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c371t-f6571998abc303b7ddddfa87819b73f555825caaa08cd728edaabf5b0714042c3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2017</creationdate><topic>Asymmetric cost information</topic><topic>Bidding</topic><topic>Capacity reservation</topic><topic>Decision processes</topic><topic>Demand</topic><topic>Impact analysis</topic><topic>Marginal costs</topic><topic>Outsourcing</topic><topic>Studies</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Mahadevan, B.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Hazra, Jishnu</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Jain, Tarun</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Computer and Information Systems Abstracts</collection><collection>Mechanical & Transportation Engineering Abstracts</collection><collection>Technology Research Database</collection><collection>Engineering Research Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Computer Science Collection</collection><collection>Advanced Technologies Database with Aerospace</collection><collection>Computer and Information Systems Abstracts Academic</collection><collection>Computer and Information Systems Abstracts Professional</collection><jtitle>European journal of operational research</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Mahadevan, B.</au><au>Hazra, Jishnu</au><au>Jain, Tarun</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Services outsourcing under asymmetric cost information</atitle><jtitle>European journal of operational research</jtitle><date>2017-03-01</date><risdate>2017</risdate><volume>257</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>456</spage><epage>467</epage><pages>456-467</pages><issn>0377-2217</issn><eissn>1872-6860</eissn><coden>EJORDT</coden><abstract>•We analyze a service supply chain where client firm sources from a set of vendors.•Vendor’s variable cost structure is private information.•We find as cost variation increases, optimum number of vendors decreases.•We find a threshold policy of impact of demand uncertainty on size of vendor base.
In this paper, we investigate the impact of cost heterogeneity on the optimal sourcing strategy of a client firm that outsources her service requirements to a set of outside vendors/service providers. We analyze a typical situation involving service providers, who differ from one another with respect to the marginal cost and characterize the firm’s optimal size of vendor network. In our model, the client firm does not have complete information about the vendors’ cost structure.
From the client firm’s perspective, for the case when the open market demand distribution is Uniform and the buyer’s demand is Normally distributed, we analytically derive the capacity to be procured as well as and the optimal number of vendors to be awarded the contract. Our analysis reveals that with an increase in vendor base cost heterogeneity, the optimum number of required vendors decreases. We further conclude that when the mean demand of the client firm is below a threshold value, then as the client firm’s demand variability increases, the optimal number of vendors increases. Whereas, in case the client firm’s mean demand is above the threshold value, then the optimal size of vendor base decreases as the client firm’s demand variability increases.</abstract><cop>Amsterdam</cop><pub>Elsevier B.V</pub><doi>10.1016/j.ejor.2016.07.020</doi><tpages>12</tpages></addata></record> |
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subjects | Asymmetric cost information Bidding Capacity reservation Decision processes Demand Impact analysis Marginal costs Outsourcing Studies |
title | Services outsourcing under asymmetric cost information |
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