Using institutional multiplicity to address corruption as a collective action problem: Lessons from the Brazilian case

•Corruption is traditionally framed as a principal-agent problem.•However, it may be more accurately described as a collective action problem.•Unfortunately, this has not offered many helpful suggestions for policy reforms.•This paper tries to address this gap.•“Institutional Multiplicity” could hel...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Quarterly review of economics and finance 2016-11, Vol.62, p.56-65
Hauptverfasser:	Carson, Lindsey D., Prado, Mariana Mota
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Accountability Agency theory Brazil Collective action Collectivism Corruption Corruption in government Hypotheses Institutions Social change Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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