Rawlsian Stability
Despite great advances in recent scholarship on the political philosophy of John Rawls, Rawls’s conception of stability is not fully appreciated. This essay aims to remedy this by articulating a more complete understanding of stability and its role in Rawls’s theory of justice. I argue that even in...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Res publica (Liverpool, England) England), 2016-08, Vol.22 (3), p.285-299 |
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| description | Despite great advances in recent scholarship on the political philosophy of John Rawls, Rawls’s conception of stability is not fully appreciated. This essay aims to remedy this by articulating a more complete understanding of stability and its role in Rawls’s theory of justice. I argue that even in
A Theory of Justice
Rawls (i) maintains that within liberal democratic constitutionalism judgments of relative stability typically adjudicate decisively among conceptions of justice and (ii) is committed to (i) more deeply than to the substantive content of justice as fairness. This essay thus emphasizes the continuity of Rawls’s thought over time and motivates the position that Rawlsian stability is as philosophically significant and distinctively Rawlsian as justice as fairness itself. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11158-015-9292-z |
| format | Article |
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A Theory of Justice
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A Theory of Justice
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A Theory of Justice
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| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; HeinOnline Law Journal Library; SpringerNature Journals; EBSCOhost Political Science Complete |
| subjects | Constitutionalism Education Equity Ethics Justice Legal History Philosophy Philosophy of Law Political Philosophy Political Theory Politics Rawls, John Scholarship Stability Theories of Law |
| title | Rawlsian Stability |
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