The Western Indo-Pacific: India, China, and the Terms of Engagement

The Western Indo-Pacific: India, China, and the Terms of Engagement

[...]it would have been astounding if China had indefinitely outsourced the security of these critical sea lines of communication to the navies of strategic competitor the United States and U.S. allies and partners. China has now demonstrated that it can send nuclear-powered attack submarines to pat...

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Veröffentlicht in:Asia policy 2016-07 (22), p.61-68
1. Verfasser: Medcalf, Rory
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Sprache:eng
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Armed forces
Cooperation
Diplomacy
Military exercises
Power
ROUNDTABLE: India and China at Sea: A Contest of Status and Legitimacy in the Indian Ocean
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description [...]it would have been astounding if China had indefinitely outsourced the security of these critical sea lines of communication to the navies of strategic competitor the United States and U.S. allies and partners. China has now demonstrated that it can send nuclear-powered attack submarines to patrol the northern reaches of the Indian Ocean, and these ships are plainly not platforms for countering piracy.\n For the past decade, India has often been the more passive participant in these emerging maritime security partnerships, leaving its interests somewhat subject to shifts in political or strategic focus among the other players.
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source PAIS Index; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; Political Science Complete; EZB-FREE-00999 freely available EZB journals
subjects Armed forces
Cooperation
Diplomacy
Military exercises
Power
ROUNDTABLE: India and China at Sea: A Contest of Status and Legitimacy in the Indian Ocean
title The Western Indo-Pacific: India, China, and the Terms of Engagement
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