Do Fiscal Rules Matter?
Fiscal rules are laws aimed at reducing the incentive to accumulate debt, and many countries adopt them to discipline local governments. Yet, their effectiveness is disputed because of commitment and enforcement problems. We study their impact applying a quasi-experimental design in Italy. In 1999,...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | American economic journal. Applied economics 2016-07, Vol.8 (3), p.1-30 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 30 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 3 |
| container_start_page | 1 |
| container_title | American economic journal. Applied economics |
| container_volume | 8 |
| creator | Grembi, Veronica Nannicini, Tommaso Troiano, Ugo |
| description | Fiscal rules are laws aimed at reducing the incentive to accumulate debt, and many countries adopt them to discipline local governments. Yet, their effectiveness is disputed because of commitment and enforcement problems. We study their impact applying a quasi-experimental design in Italy. In 1999, the central government imposed fiscal rules on municipal governments, and in 2001 relaxed them below 5,000 inhabitants. We exploit the before/after and discontinuous policy variation, and show that relaxing fiscal rules increases deficits and lowers taxes. The effect is larger if the mayor can be reelected, the number of parties is higher, and voters are older. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1257/app.20150076 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_1800149391</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>24739127</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>24739127</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c387t-7d5526c535fe2c73d721fd8d3b6627924f0818e91753b883822375122e5ef62b3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNo9j01LxDAURYMoOI7uBFdCwa0d895r8pKVyOioMCKIrkM_UphSbU06C__9VKqzundxuJcjxDnIBaDim7zvFyhBScn6QMzAZipltvJw3w0ei5MYGyk1aVIzcXHfJatNLPM2edu2PiYv-TD4cHsqjuq8jf7sL-fiY_XwvnxK16-Pz8u7dVqS4SHlSinUpSJVeyyZKkaoK1NRoTWyxayWBoy3wIoKY8ggEitA9MrXGguai6tptw_d99bHwTXdNnyNlw6MlJBZsjBS1xNVhi7G4GvXh81nHn4cSPer7kZ1968-4pcT3sShC3sWMx7HkGkHbu9RcQ</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1800149391</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Do Fiscal Rules Matter?</title><source>JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing</source><source>American Economic Association Web</source><creator>Grembi, Veronica ; Nannicini, Tommaso ; Troiano, Ugo</creator><creatorcontrib>Grembi, Veronica ; Nannicini, Tommaso ; Troiano, Ugo</creatorcontrib><description>Fiscal rules are laws aimed at reducing the incentive to accumulate debt, and many countries adopt them to discipline local governments. Yet, their effectiveness is disputed because of commitment and enforcement problems. We study their impact applying a quasi-experimental design in Italy. In 1999, the central government imposed fiscal rules on municipal governments, and in 2001 relaxed them below 5,000 inhabitants. We exploit the before/after and discontinuous policy variation, and show that relaxing fiscal rules increases deficits and lowers taxes. The effect is larger if the mayor can be reelected, the number of parties is higher, and voters are older.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1945-7782</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1945-7790</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1257/app.20150076</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>American Economic Association</publisher><subject>Debt service ; Economic theory ; Economics ; Federal government ; Fiscal policy ; International ; Local government ; Municipal government ; Studies ; Trends</subject><ispartof>American economic journal. Applied economics, 2016-07, Vol.8 (3), p.1-30</ispartof><rights>Copyright © 2016 American Economic Association</rights><rights>Copyright American Economic Association Jul 2016</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c387t-7d5526c535fe2c73d721fd8d3b6627924f0818e91753b883822375122e5ef62b3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c387t-7d5526c535fe2c73d721fd8d3b6627924f0818e91753b883822375122e5ef62b3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/24739127$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/24739127$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,803,3748,27924,27925,58017,58250</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Grembi, Veronica</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Nannicini, Tommaso</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Troiano, Ugo</creatorcontrib><title>Do Fiscal Rules Matter?</title><title>American economic journal. Applied economics</title><description>Fiscal rules are laws aimed at reducing the incentive to accumulate debt, and many countries adopt them to discipline local governments. Yet, their effectiveness is disputed because of commitment and enforcement problems. We study their impact applying a quasi-experimental design in Italy. In 1999, the central government imposed fiscal rules on municipal governments, and in 2001 relaxed them below 5,000 inhabitants. We exploit the before/after and discontinuous policy variation, and show that relaxing fiscal rules increases deficits and lowers taxes. The effect is larger if the mayor can be reelected, the number of parties is higher, and voters are older.</description><subject>Debt service</subject><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Economics</subject><subject>Federal government</subject><subject>Fiscal policy</subject><subject>International</subject><subject>Local government</subject><subject>Municipal government</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Trends</subject><issn>1945-7782</issn><issn>1945-7790</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2016</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><recordid>eNo9j01LxDAURYMoOI7uBFdCwa0d895r8pKVyOioMCKIrkM_UphSbU06C__9VKqzundxuJcjxDnIBaDim7zvFyhBScn6QMzAZipltvJw3w0ei5MYGyk1aVIzcXHfJatNLPM2edu2PiYv-TD4cHsqjuq8jf7sL-fiY_XwvnxK16-Pz8u7dVqS4SHlSinUpSJVeyyZKkaoK1NRoTWyxayWBoy3wIoKY8ggEitA9MrXGguai6tptw_d99bHwTXdNnyNlw6MlJBZsjBS1xNVhi7G4GvXh81nHn4cSPer7kZ1968-4pcT3sShC3sWMx7HkGkHbu9RcQ</recordid><startdate>20160701</startdate><enddate>20160701</enddate><creator>Grembi, Veronica</creator><creator>Nannicini, Tommaso</creator><creator>Troiano, Ugo</creator><general>American Economic Association</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>0-V</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ALSLI</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>M2R</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>Q9U</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20160701</creationdate><title>Do Fiscal Rules Matter?</title><author>Grembi, Veronica ; Nannicini, Tommaso ; Troiano, Ugo</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c387t-7d5526c535fe2c73d721fd8d3b6627924f0818e91753b883822375122e5ef62b3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2016</creationdate><topic>Debt service</topic><topic>Economic theory</topic><topic>Economics</topic><topic>Federal government</topic><topic>Fiscal policy</topic><topic>International</topic><topic>Local government</topic><topic>Municipal government</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Trends</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Grembi, Veronica</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Nannicini, Tommaso</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Troiano, Ugo</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>ProQuest Social Sciences Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>Access via ABI/INFORM (ProQuest)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (PDF only)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>Social Science Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global</collection><collection>Social Science Database</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><jtitle>American economic journal. Applied economics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Grembi, Veronica</au><au>Nannicini, Tommaso</au><au>Troiano, Ugo</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Do Fiscal Rules Matter?</atitle><jtitle>American economic journal. Applied economics</jtitle><date>2016-07-01</date><risdate>2016</risdate><volume>8</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>1</spage><epage>30</epage><pages>1-30</pages><issn>1945-7782</issn><eissn>1945-7790</eissn><abstract>Fiscal rules are laws aimed at reducing the incentive to accumulate debt, and many countries adopt them to discipline local governments. Yet, their effectiveness is disputed because of commitment and enforcement problems. We study their impact applying a quasi-experimental design in Italy. In 1999, the central government imposed fiscal rules on municipal governments, and in 2001 relaxed them below 5,000 inhabitants. We exploit the before/after and discontinuous policy variation, and show that relaxing fiscal rules increases deficits and lowers taxes. The effect is larger if the mayor can be reelected, the number of parties is higher, and voters are older.</abstract><pub>American Economic Association</pub><doi>10.1257/app.20150076</doi><tpages>30</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 1945-7782 |
| ispartof | American economic journal. Applied economics, 2016-07, Vol.8 (3), p.1-30 |
| issn | 1945-7782 1945-7790 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_1800149391 |
| source | JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; American Economic Association Web |
| subjects | Debt service Economic theory Economics Federal government Fiscal policy International Local government Municipal government Studies Trends |
| title | Do Fiscal Rules Matter? |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-29T04%3A50%3A55IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Do%20Fiscal%20Rules%20Matter?&rft.jtitle=American%20economic%20journal.%20Applied%20economics&rft.au=Grembi,%20Veronica&rft.date=2016-07-01&rft.volume=8&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=1&rft.epage=30&rft.pages=1-30&rft.issn=1945-7782&rft.eissn=1945-7790&rft_id=info:doi/10.1257/app.20150076&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E24739127%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1800149391&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=24739127&rfr_iscdi=true |