Constitutional revolutions and the constituent power: A rejoinder to Jan Komárek

Constitutional revolutions and the constituent power: A rejoinder to Jan Komárek

Responding to Jan Komarek's "Constitutional Revolutions and the Constituent Power: A Reply to Mark Tushnet" I argue that positing that constitutions "recognize" rights from some external source presents the problem, addressed in the theory of the right of revolution, that co...

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Veröffentlicht in:International journal of constitutional law 2015-10, Vol.13 (4), p.1059-1062
1. Verfasser: Tushnet, Mark
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Constitutions
Power
Revolutions
Right wing politics
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description Responding to Jan Komarek's "Constitutional Revolutions and the Constituent Power: A Reply to Mark Tushnet" I argue that positing that constitutions "recognize" rights from some external source presents the problem, addressed in the theory of the right of revolution, that constitutions might "recognize" the wrong set of rights, and in particular might recognize as rights principles that should not so qualify. In a related argument, I contend that exercises of the right of revolution need not be only to protect the constitution, but can occur against a government that is faithfully complying with a defective constitution.
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source Oxford University Press Journals All Titles (1996-Current); Political Science Complete; PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; HeinOnline Law Journal Library
subjects Constitutions
Power
Revolutions
Right wing politics
title Constitutional revolutions and the constituent power: A rejoinder to Jan Komárek
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