NORMS MAKE PREFERENCES SOCIAL
We explore the idea that prosocial behavior in experimental games is driven by social norms imported into the laboratory. Under this view, differences in behavior across subjects is driven by heterogeneity in sensitivity to social norms. We introduce an incentivized method of eliciting individual no...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of the European Economic Association 2016-06, Vol.14 (3), p.608-638 |
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| container_title | Journal of the European Economic Association |
| container_volume | 14 |
| creator | Kimbrough, Erik O. Vostroknutov, Alexander |
| description | We explore the idea that prosocial behavior in experimental games is driven by social norms imported into the laboratory. Under this view, differences in behavior across subjects is driven by heterogeneity in sensitivity to social norms. We introduce an incentivized method of eliciting individual normsensitivity, and we show how it relates to play in public goods, trust, dictator, and ultimatum games.We show how our observations can be rationalized in a stylized model of norm-dependent preferences under reasonable assumptions about the nature of social norms. Then we directly elicit norms in these games to test the robustness of our interpretation. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/jeea.12152 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Journal of the European Economic Association, 2016-06, Vol.14 (3), p.608-638 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; Oxford Journals Online; Business Source Complete |
| subjects | C91 C92 D03 Economic models Game theory Norms Social norms |
| title | NORMS MAKE PREFERENCES SOCIAL |
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